POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE IRELAND’S GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. ESRI RESEARCH SERIES NUMBER 9 JULY 2009 by Legge, Thomas & Scott, Sue
  
 
 
RESEARCH SERIES  
NUMBER 9 
JULY 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY OPTIONS  
TO REDUCE 
IRELAND’S  
GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
THOMAS LEGGE  
AND  
SUE SCOTT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available online at www.esri.ie 
The Economic and Social Research Institute (Limited Company No. 18269). 
Registered Office: Whitaker Square,  
Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Thomas Legge is Program Officer, Climate and Energy Program, German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. Sue Scott is an Associate Research Professor at the Economic 
and Social Research Institute.  
 
The paper has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does not itself take 
institutional policy positions. Accordingly, the authors are solely responsible for the content and 
the views expressed. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH SERIES  
NUMBER 9 
JULY 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY OPTIONS  
TO REDUCE 
IRELAND’S  
GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
THOMAS LEGGE  
AND  
SUE SCOTT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
DUBLIN, 2009 
 
ISBN 978 0 7070 0284 2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 The authors wish to thank the Environmental Protection Agency for its financial support 
towards this publication, provided under the STRIVE Programme. 
 
The authors are grateful to the team of Deirdre Whitaker, Regina Moore and Mary Cleary for 
their work in guiding this document through the publication process.  
 
They are also grateful to members of the sub-group, chaired by Mary Kelly, on Instruments and 
Measures within the Institute of International and European Affairs’ working group on climate 
change, to the ESRI director Frances Ruane, and to colleagues John Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, 
Laura Malaguzzi Valeri and Richard Tol for advice and information supplied. Two anonymous 
referees are thanked for their helpful suggestions. The authors alone are responsible for all errors. 
 
 
 
 
IV 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Chapter Page 
 
 
Executive Summary VII 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
 
2. Trends in Irish Greenhouse Gas Emissions 3 
 
 2.1 A Note on Greenhouse Gas Accounting Methods 4 
 
 
3. Policies and Principles 6 
 
 3.1 Underlying Principles for the Next Phase of Irish Climate Policy 8 
 
 
4. A Survey of Climate Policy Options Available to Ireland 12 
 
 4.1 Legislative Instruments 13 
 4.2 Market- and Incentive-based Instruments 19 
 4.3 Standards and Regulations 32 
 4.4 Subsidies 37 
 4.5 Research and Development Policy 39 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications for Ireland 42 
 
 
Annex 1: Annualised Emission Reductions 47 
 
 
Annex 2: Carbon Taxes at Rates Ranging from €5 to €30 Per Tonne CO2 48 
 
 
References   49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V 
  
 VI
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
    Page 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector 1990-2007 4 
 
 
Figure 2: Cost and Technical Potentials for Reducing CO2 Emissions in the UK 10 
 
 
Figure 3: The Effect of Environmental Tax Reform 21 
 
 
Figure 4: IEA Member Government Budgets for Total Renewable Energy 
R&D Annual Investments for 1974-2003 and Investment Per Capita, 
Averaged Between 1990 and 2003  41 
 EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  
Owing to the economic recession from 2008 Ireland is likely to meet its 
commitments for 2008-2012 under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, the longer term targets that the 
European Union has set for 2020 are still stringent. Those sectors of the 
Irish economy that participate in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) must reduce their emissions by 21 per cent below their 2005 levels. 
The remainder, and bulk, of Ireland’s emissions must reduce by 20 per cent 
on their 2005 level. In quantity terms, this is a target of some 56 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 2020, compared to the 
approximately 69 million tonnes emitted in 2007. Forecasting is particularly 
difficult under changing economic conditions, but on the basis of plausible 
assumptions, known policies and trends prevailing up to April 2009, 
emissions in 2020 could be marginally higher than their 2005 level without 
additional policies and measures. If there is a broader international 
commitment agreed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the European commitment will strengthen to a reduction of 30 
per cent. Although Ireland’s reductions are insignificant in global terms, it 
can make a promising contribution to global efforts by showing how 
worthwhile an efficient approach to climate policy can be. 
 
This paper addresses both the political challenge that is faced in moving 
to a low-carbon state and the economic approaches. The extent and the 
nature of the issue have not been adequately confronted, as illustrated by 
the absence of this subject until now from the primary forum for policy 
agenda-setting, the Social Partnership. At the same time attempts at serious 
policy change in Ireland have been hostage to sectoral interests that rival 
the national good. Yet a successful response to the economic and social 
crises of the 1980s via the Social Partnership suggests that progress is 
attainable. Three principles will help to guide progress. 
 
• Keep down costs: There are many actions and technologies available 
for reducing emissions, as seen in estimates of abatement costs. Rather 
than dictate technologies and sectoral targets, policies that provide a 
framework to encourage best choices are likely to avoid costly mistakes.  
  
• Charge an equal emissions price: Imposing a price on emissions would 
rectify the underlying problem, which is the over-exploitation of the 
Earth’s limited absorptive capacity, a scarce but un-priced common 
resource. The price needs to be the same for all emissions, otherwise 
some low-cost opportunities for reducing emissions will be overlooked 
and high-cost alternatives used unnecessarily. 
 
• Control the macroeconomic impact: To achieve such sizable reductions 
in emissions risks imposing considerable expense on the economy, in 
macroeconomic terms even. Efficient policies are required that take the 
overall economic effect into consideration in order to leave Ireland 
with adequate resources to help vulnerable sectors. 
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Under these guiding principles, the following approaches to reducing 
emissions are evaluated: 
 
Legislative approaches: Direct government control plays a role in a balanced 
set of policy approaches. A legally binding long-term target along the lines 
of targets passed in California and the United Kingdom could provide 
political certainty for government departments, private businesses and 
other stakeholders, although there are doubts about its legal usefulness. 
The proposed Climate Change Commission foreseen in the National 
Climate Change Strategy, if sufficiently insulated from political 
interference, could ensure a continuous review of Ireland’s climate 
performance, by throwing light on costs of emissions abatement and 
effectiveness of policies and measures and by effecting an open and 
iterative process of policy coordination, including public participation and 
submission. Government also has a role in regulating the use of the 
international flexible mechanisms to ensure that credits are limited to 
projects that constitute genuine additional reductions. Finally, the State is 
the largest single landlord with a large fleet of vehicles and bulk purchasing 
power, and – more so than many private-sector actors – it has the ability to 
base economic decisions on a long time frame. The public sector should be 
required to state its emissions, attach a price to them and adopt highest 
standards, consistent with value for money. 
 
Market- and incentive-based approaches: Fiscal measures, such as carbon 
taxes, and emissions trading systems are particularly appropriate because 
they put a price on emitting carbon while allowing actors to respond in 
varying ways appropriate to their own individual costs of abatement. 
Abatement costs vary widely, so a framework that automatically encourages 
low-cost abatement achieves considerable savings. These instruments give 
a continuous and automatic incentive for the adoption of better abatement 
technologies. Given that only about 30 per cent of Ireland’s emissions are 
priced (those covered by the EU ETS), coverage should be extended. 
Carbon taxes have important advantages for achieving this. By setting a 
credible long-term price on emissions, at a stroke more energy efficiency 
investments become viable to the would-be investors. R&D is similarly 
encouraged and revenue is generated. Revenues are most helpful if put 
towards reducing income or labour taxes to aid the economy’s 
competitiveness, with a share set aside to boost the low incomes of 
vulnerable households, to ensure fairness. The major disadvantage of 
carbon taxes is the political difficulty of introducing them, as seen in the 
decision of 2004 to cancel their introduction in Ireland, and the possibility 
of political interference generally. Another perceived disadvantage is that 
some sectors are insensitive to price in the short run, as in transport (which 
reflects the high short-term abatement costs in this sector), but here 
additional measures such as road and congestion charging, provision of 
alternatives by public transport and settlement planning can also play a role. 
 
Trading schemes such as the EU ETS can provide certainty that a 
specified reduction in emissions will be achieved but the carbon price is 
uncertain, which discourages would-be investors. Unless the permits are 
auctioned, the share-out of permits can be unfair and politically 
manipulated, and can benefit incumbents and encourage poor 
environmental standards in anticipation. Freely allocated permits still raise 
prices but give windfall gains to firms. As with carbon taxes, governments 
should appropriate the gain in order to be able to cushion effects on the 
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economy and the vulnerable according to need. Suggested variants of 
trading schemes applied at personal level are unlikely to pass on these 
criteria. Price volatility can be addressed by imposing a floor and ceiling. 
Such an approach would be applied at EU level and would have to be 
consistent with linking to schemes elsewhere in the world. Border tax 
adjustments can address concerns that industries will not be able to 
compete in trade with countries that do not impose a price on carbon or 
other environmental constraints.  
 
Border tax adjustments would impose charges on imports, or give reliefs 
on exports, aligning treatment of traded goods with that of goods made at 
home. Such measures, which would be applied at EU level and would 
apply to only a few truly vulnerable sectors, seem to be allowed under 
international trade rules provided that there is no discrimination. But given 
the resistance to what could be interpreted as protectionist behaviour, 
border adjustments should be seen as a last resort in case there is no 
international agreement. 
 
Standards and regulations: These can be crude, costly and bureaucratic but 
standards and regulations are helpful in clear instances of market failure, 
where information is hard to assimilate but benefits (as in buildings 
insulation) are unquestionable. Information schemes themselves can 
support regulations as they can catch the imagination and raise 
understanding and awareness. Eco-labelling and clearer metering can help 
to overcome barriers to would-be investors. Other areas to address include 
proper project assessment for infrastructure projects, integrated spatial 
planning, requiring that extra coal-fired electricity generation be contingent 
on carbon capture and sequestration, mandating a share of electricity 
generation from renewable sources, and mandating (and funding) the 
necessary adjustments to the national grid to facilitate increased penetration 
of renewable electricity technologies. In general, though, multiple targets 
can misdirect effort and the first option should be to ensure that carbon 
emissions are correctly priced. 
 
Subsidies: Subsidies can give incentives to people to invest and behave in 
carbon-reducing ways. Calls for incentives are in effect calls for more 
taxation and are often misdirected, for instance subsidies to inappropriate 
renewable fuels (like biofuels) and subsidies that actually increase fuel 
usage, requiring further subsidies to rectify the resulting comparative 
disadvantages. Subsidies for the adoption of new technology do not in 
themselves reduce emissions and they can be an expensive approach when 
properly judged in terms of cost per tonne of carbon reduced. One 
appropriate kind of subsidy is for research and development. The spillovers 
from R&D and diffusion are positive externalities because these benefits 
often do not accrue to those engaged in R&D and diffusion. 
 
In conclusion, the policies to apply are those that ensure a long-term 
credible price applies to all carbon emissions and are accompanied by 
measures that support society, competitiveness and innovation. But how to 
implement such a policy mix is still an open question. A major step would 
be recognition that the framework requires protection from short-term 
political interference, clearly defined incentives through a price on all 
carbon, and a transparent, dynamic and fair process with which the public 
can engage. 
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The resolving scientific consensus about the causes and implications of 
climate change presents a policy challenge to governments: how to 
decarbonise economies and adapt them to avoid the worst effects of 
climate change in an efficient, or at least in a cost-effective, manner. 
Following internationally accepted principles articulated in the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), industrialised 
countries are expected to take the earliest action, for which the targets of 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol – which expire in 2012 – are seen as a first 
contribution.1 In December 2007, at a UN conference in Bali, Indonesia, 
the international community began negotiations towards a new global 
climate agreement to deal with the post-2012 period. There are high 
expectations that an ambitious agreement will be reached at the follow-up 
UN conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. This optimism is partly 
due to the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States, who 
campaigned on a promise to reduce US greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020 and by a further 80 per cent by 2050.2 This offers the 
possibility of a renewed engagement by the United States in the 
international climate regime. Meanwhile the European Council – the 
regular summit of EU heads of state and government – finalised a 
unilateral commitment in December 2008 to reduce overall EU emissions 
by 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020; the European Union will extend 
this commitment to 30 per cent in the event of a global deal with similar 
commitments by other major industrialised countries. This goal is also seen 
as a stage in the longer-term aim by developed countries to reduce their 
emissions collectively by 60-80 per cent by 2050. The common EU 
position and the improved possibility of a renewed global response sends a 
signal to stakeholders in Ireland that the debate about climate change has 
turned from whether to act to how to act.3  
 
The Irish government faces the political challenge of contributing to this 
ambitious EU goal even though its own emissions have been rising since 
1990, the baseline year of the Kyoto Protocol. Ireland may technically meet 
its commitments up to 2012 – set under an EU agreement at an increase of 
no more than 13 per cent above 1990 levels – through the effects of the 
economic downturn and a mixture of limited domestic policies and 
 
1 The UNFCCC was negotiated in 1992. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is a subordinate treaty 
to the UNFCCC. 
2 George W. Bush also campaigned with a pledge to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, 
although his subsequent jettisoning of this promise was one of the early acts of his 
Administration. 
3 The European Commission launched a public consultation on the approach the 
European Union should take on the global post-2012 climate change agreement, following 
the Commission’s Communication “Limiting Global Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The 
way ahead for 2020 and beyond”. 
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measures and the possible purchase of additional permits via international 
trading. But the country will require more ambitious domestic policies and 
measures to contribute to the longer-term targets that the European Union 
has set for the period to 2020, depending on the timing of the economic 
up-turn, and certainly for the period beyond. 
 
Climate change is a great and wide-ranging form of market failure (as 
described in the Stern Review: HM Treasury, 2006). The pricing of global 
resources (in this case the Earth’s atmosphere) does not take appropriate 
account of the services they provide or their scarcity, and actors in the 
global economic system can make financial gains from activities that 
disregard the long-term collective interest of the planet. Such resources that 
are not naturally subject to anybody’s control are prone to the “tragedy of 
the commons”, a well-documented situation where free access and 
unrestricted demand leads to over-exploitation (Hardin, 1968). As with 
other kinds of market failure, climate change calls on governments to 
intervene with policies and measures that benefit society as a whole. 
Government intervention can correct for the market failure by providing 
an enabling framework, through legislation, incentives, and above all the 
predictability of forward planning.  
 
This paper surveys some of the options available to the Irish 
government to change Ireland’s long-term emissions trajectory. We begin 
by sketching the trends of Ireland’s emissions to date and the policies and 
measures already adopted by governments over the past decade, seeking to 
place these measures in the political-economic context of decision making 
in Ireland during the years of rapid economic growth. We survey the main 
options available to the government, which are legislative measures, 
market- and incentive-based measures, standards and regulations; subsidies 
and research and development. We discuss the respective arguments for 
and against these various approaches. Finally, we set down some basic 
normative principles that should support climate policy in Ireland in the 
future, including a minimised cost of reduction (with equal cost per 
emission reduced), regulatory certainty, clearly defined incentives and a 
transparent, dynamic and fair process for decision making and policy 
implementation. 
2. TRENDS IN IRISH 
GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 
The overall trend in Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions has until recently 
been a fairly steady rise since 1990, the baseline year for most greenhouse 
gas emissions. The trends up to 2007 broken down by economic sector are 
shown in Figure 1 (EPA, 2009b). The main exception to the rising trend 
was the significant but temporary drop in emissions from industry in 2003 
due to some plant closures and the replacement of some oil with natural 
gas for electricity generation. Emissions in 2007 stood at 69.2 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent (Mt CO2e) and were nearly 25 per cent above 
1990 baseline estimate. The most significant and sustained increase has 
been in the transport sector, where emissions have increased to over two 
and three quarters times their 1990 levels, due almost entirely to road 
transport. Emissions from the energy-industries sector (mainly electricity 
generation) in 2007 were some 27 per cent above 1990 levels. Although 
these emissions have declined of late, the commissioning of new peat-fired 
electricity generating plant has set back some improvements. Emissions in 
the agriculture sector increased over the course of the 1990s but have 
recently declined as a result of a reduction in both livestock populations 
and fertiliser use. Emissions from the residential sector fell somewhat as 
households shifted from coal and peat to oil and natural gas, but this trend 
has been countered by recent increases in population and housing stock. 
Emissions from the industry and commercial sector, following increases to 
2001, have stabilised somewhat in recent years. There has been a 
downward trend in emissions from the industrial and energy enterprises 
participating in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which began 
in 2005. Verified greenhouse gas emissions from covered sectors have 
declined from 22.4 million tonnes in 2005 to 20.4 million tonnes reported 
for 2008. 
 
Taking account of the downturn to date, Ireland may achieve its Kyoto 
target because of the exceptional economic circumstances. Attention must 
however turn to 2020, for which the targets have 2005 as their base year. 
Ireland’s emissions can be split into two sectors. Entities with high 
emissions, consisting largely of electricity generators and responsible for 
about 30 per cent of Ireland’s emissions, are in the EU ETS (discussed in 
detail in Section 4.2.2. The remaining emitters, termed the non-ETS sector, 
are responsible for the emissions from all the rest of the economy. Ireland’s 
emissions in the non-ETS sector are subject to a 2020 target fall of 20 per 
cent on their 2005 level (EPA, 2009a). For the ETS sector there are no 
specifically national targets  but the  target for the EU ETS sector overall is 
3 
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Figure 1: Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector 1990-2007  
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Source: EPA (2009b). 
 
 
for a 21 per cent decline on 2005 levels. For the sake of argument, 
assuming a simple pro rata 21 per cent decline in Ireland’s ETS emissions 
would thus require at least a 20 per cent cut in total emissions by Ireland by 
2020. In quantity terms, this is a target of some 56 million tonnes of CO2e 
that can be emitted in 2020, compared to the approximately 69 million 
tonnes emitted in 2007. A longer-term commitment to reduce Ireland’s 
emissions to 80 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050 would require the very 
challenging target of annual cuts of 4 per cent (see Annex 1).  
 
Economic conditions make forecasting particularly difficult at present 
but, on the basis of plausible assumptions and current trends, emissions in 
2020 could be marginally higher than their 2005 level without additional 
policies and measures. This would mean that at least a 20 per cent 
reduction still has to be made on the projected 2020 figure. This is less 
demanding than the 40 per cent cut that was based on pre-recession 
projections. This target is nonetheless still very demanding. If, on foot of 
international co-operation, the European Union adopts the more ambitious 
30 per cent cut, Ireland’s 2020 target could drop further to some 48 million 
tonnes. (DEHLG 2007; CEC, 2008; Fitz Gerald et al., 2008). Given 
Ireland’s precarious economic circumstances, policies other than the most 
efficient ones are not a sensible option. 
 
 The current international approach to estimating emissions calculates 
emissions that actually occur in the country in question. A country could 
consume large amounts of imported goods that are emissions-intensive in 
the making, and these would not be reflected in its accounts; meanwhile 
emissions from its cattle or its electricity production, though consumed 
abroad, are included. Guidelines for measuring emissions are consistent if 
either emissions due to consumption or emissions due to production are 
counted. Arguably, a more accurate accounting methodology would 
measure those due to consumption, insofar as the action of using the 
electricity or eating the meat is what drives the production that causes 
emissions. This would also avoid misreading emissions patterns due to the 
2.1 
A Note on 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Accounting 
Methods 
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movement of dirty industries abroad – a movement known as “carbon 
leakage”. If the emissions embodied in Ireland’s imports were calculated4 
and included, and emissions embodied in exports were excluded, some 33 
million tonnes of CO2 were emitted in producing Ireland’s imports in 2005, 
while 11 million tonnes were emitted in Ireland in producing goods for 
consumption abroad. This casts Ireland’s performance in a truer but even 
less favourable light, and goes some way to explain the strong reduction in 
the emissions intensity of Ireland’s GDP. With emissions based on 
production, developing countries (which produce and export carbon-
intensive goods) could find themselves asked to do proportionately more 
than their own carbon consumption dictates (Helm, 2008a; IEA, 2008). 
 
4 For example, as calculated for Ireland in The Medium-Term Review 2008-2015 (Fitz Gerald 
et al., 2008). This is sometimes called “virtual” or ”embedded” emissions. Figure 5.4 in the 
Review shows carbon dioxide emissions from Final Demand within Ireland, which includes 
imports. 
 
3. POLICIES AND 
PRINCIPLES 
Irish emissions have until recently been increasing above Ireland’s 
international commitments and stated domestic policy goals. The present 
economic downturn, while affording a breathing space, risks masking the 
underlying trend. This failure is a result of an insufficiently clear strategy on 
climate change and a lack of a coordinated approach across different 
government departments and agencies since climate change rose to 
prominence as a national policy issue. The 2000 National Climate Change 
Strategy contained a number of measures that could have helped constrain 
Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions but its most important component, the 
carbon tax, as well as specific measures like the conversion of the 
Moneypoint coal-fired electricity generating plant to natural-gas firing, were 
not implemented.5 In the meantime, major infrastructure programmes have 
been implemented without full consideration of their likely impact on 
emissions. For example, a network of motorways has been built to 
stimulate economic growth, but the lack of warranted investment in public 
transport and the absence of controls on urban sprawl have allowed these 
investments to drive up transport-related emissions (Morgenroth and Fitz 
Gerald, 2006). These are long-term investments whose true value for 
money might have been lower if the cost of their associated carbon 
emissions had been taken into account at the time of their appraisal. These 
investments are likely to lock transport in to its current pattern for decades 
or longer. 
 
The manner in which policy is developed in Ireland helps to explain the 
historical failure to grapple with the challenge of climate change. Much 
national policy in Ireland is developed through consultative processes, 
particularly through the Social Partnership, a forum where representatives 
of government, employers, trade unions, farming interests and other 
sectors negotiate wage agreements and other policy directions. The Social 
Partnership has been successful in aligning Ireland’s economic and social 
policies while improving competitiveness and avoiding inflation and has 
been credited with leading the country out of the political, economic and 
social crises of the 1980s (O’Donnell, 1998, p. 11). But until recently the 
Social Partnership  paid  scant  attention  to  climate  change  and  it  
has  excluded  environmental  groups  from  the  parties  represented in the  
 
5 Moneypoint was extensively refurbished to install sulphur scrubbers instead. 
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negotiations.6 The absence of this subject from the primary forum for 
policy agenda-setting may have relegated climate change to a subject of 
secondary importance. At the same time radical policy change in Ireland 
has been hostage to important sectoral interests. The failure of the 
government to introduce a carbon tax in 2004 was partly due to active 
lobbying by business groups and opposition from within the government 
itself: the then-minister for finance, Charlie McCreevy, said that the tax 
would bring minimal emission reductions at a high bureaucratic cost. In 
this he was supported by some trade unions, who said that a carbon tax 
would have a disproportionate effect on the poor. Although these claims 
were disputed at the time (by, among others, the then chairman of 
Sustainable Energy Ireland and by research from the Economic and Social 
Research Institute, which showed that the potentially regressive effect of a 
carbon tax could be offset by directing some of the revenues to social 
welfare), the lack of a champion from within the policymaking system 
undermined the case for the carbon tax.7 Another feature is the 
idiosyncratic electoral system in Ireland in which all politicians, including 
ministers, are elected by proportional representation in multi-seat 
constituencies, making them particularly sensitive to sectional issues at the 
occasional expense of national priorities.  
 
But such systemic explanations only go so far to explain why Ireland is 
not engaging in optimal policies to meet its national greenhouse gas 
emission commitments. Indeed, the successful national response via the 
Social Partnership to the economic and social crises of the 1980s suggests 
that with the same kind of understanding, political leadership and cross-
sector participation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be attainable. 
It may also be helpful for policymakers that Ireland is bound by 
international climate-change commitments. In 2004, opponents of the 
carbon tax could plausibly argue that the Kyoto Protocol might fail; today, 
in contrast, “no action” is not a possible response to the challenge of 
climate change given that Ireland is obliged under EU and UN 
commitments to reduce its emissions or pay for equivalent emission 
permits on the international market, a potentially large capital outflow that 
could pose political difficulties of its own. The commitment in the 2007 
Programme for Government that environmental interests will be 
represented in the Social Partnership as well as the strengthened capacity of 
Comhar – Sustainable Development Council (a multi-stakeholder forum 
that provides advice to government on environmental and other issues) 
could help to articulate the case for long-term climate action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The current agreement, Towards 2016, has a specific chapter on “environmental 
sustainability” (Government of Ireland, 2006). The previous agreement, Partnership 2000, 
contained a few references to the environment, mainly in the context of agriculture. The 
concept of sustainable development appeared prominently in the 2006 strategy of the 
National Economic and Social Council, Strategy 2006: People, Productivity and Purpose. 
7 “Government ‘underestimated’ effect of abandoned carbon tax”, The Irish Times, 29 
November 2004; Scott and Eakins (2004). 
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 The next phase of Ireland’s response to climate change is currently being 
developed. The background to this response is an increased certainty about 
the urgency of climate change and the likelihood of new international 
cooperation within the framework of the UNFCCC, propelled by a newly 
engaged United States. At the same time there is the strong possibility of a 
widespread and prolonged economic depression following the international 
financial crises of 2008. Ireland’s response should therefore be circumspect 
and should be based on the following basic principles: 
3.1 
Underlying 
Principles for 
the Next 
Phase of 
Irish Climate 
Policy   
1. Minimised cost of abatement: Science informs long-term targets. 
R&D, demonstration and analysis inform abatement options and cost. 
The marginal abatement cost curve (the MAC curve) underlies the cost 
to the economy of reducing its emissions. Given a quantity target, the 
MAC curve enables one to read off the permit price that would 
encourage abatement to occur up to the target level: abatement is 
encouraged because it would be cheaper than paying the permit price. 
Alternatively, given a price, one could read off the quantity of 
abatement that polluters would find worthwhile in order to avoid 
paying the permit price.8 Governments are not and cannot be 
omniscient about technologies or individual circumstances, and usually 
the bodies directly engaged are in a better position than governments to 
determine their best reduction methods and their timing.  
 
Picking technologies can have disappointing outcomes for 
governments, as seen in their promotion of bio-fuels (Ryan et al., 2006). 
In some cases this involves supporting favoured technologies, such as 
electric cars, to the relative neglect of strategies on spatial settlement or 
public transport, for example. Side effects can also be harmful, as seen 
in Germany’s over-generous subsidies to solar panels – the increase in 
demand for silicon to manufacture photovoltaic cells temporarily drove 
up the price of silicon and impeded adoption of solar panels in more 
suitable sunny countries.9 It is also wasteful to have multiple and rigid 
targets as these can unwittingly impose high abatement costs. It is 
better to facilitate flexibility by ensuring a framework that provides the 
overall incentive to reduce emissions.  
 
Examples of marginal abatement cost curves reproduced from the 
recent report of the UK Committee on Climate Change are presented 
below in Figure 2 (Committee on Climate Change, 2008). The upper 
graph refers to the UK transport sector and the lower graph to the 
residential sector. The horizontal axis measures emissions reductions. 
Going from left to right are the possible ways of reducing emissions in 
increasing order of cost. Measured on the vertical axis is the cost of 
reducing emissions per tonne of CO2. It is seen that some reductions 
 
8 The same schedule of abatement costs underlies a regime of permit trading or of carbon 
taxes. The price of permits that results from trading reflects the participants’ (true or 
perceived) marginal abatement costs at that time, subject to the fixed quantity.  
9 “More light than heat”, The Economist, 7 April 2008. http://www.economist.com/ 
world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10989479 
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can be achieved at zero or even negative cost.10 Other UK sectors 
covered in the report include industry, power, waste and so forth and 
the estimates relate to realistic potential technologies. Technical 
improvements would cause the curves, or sections of them, to be 
revised downwards, because they make it cheaper to reduce emissions. 
(The role of research and development to encourage this is discussed 
below.) 
 
The marginal abatement costs can be aggregated over all sectors to give 
national costs of reduction. As stated, checking the target level of 
reductions, or cap, against the national curve enables one to read off 
the cost of the last unit abated.11 This marginal cost is the price or tax 
that would encourage achievement of the target, because all the 
abatement actions to the left would be cheaper than the tax. A target 
reduction that is larger (further to the right) is seen from the figure to 
cost more, as higher cost abatements have to be adopted. The MAC 
curve underpins emissions mitigation regardless of policy measure 
adopted. Naturally there are many uncertainties. Side benefits, for 
example, could extend the scope of reductions by increasing the uptake 
of technologies, and costs could be driven down in unexpected ways. 
On the other hand there could also be behavioural barriers. A key point 
is not just the variation in abatement costs seen here, but the variation 
that applies across different individual entities in different 
circumstances. 
 
Over sixty estimates of the world MAC have been made by various 
researchers based on least-cost trajectories of global efforts to meet 
stabilisation targets. Kuik et al. (2009) have recently assessed these estimates 
as a group. The estimates are based on numerous assumptions as to the 
stabilisation target and baseline, the extent of flexibility in the path of 
reductions over the time period and on whether or not all greenhouse gases 
are included, and so forth. As expected, it is found that the more stringent 
the target the higher the abatement cost, while flexibility with respect to 
timing of reductions and inclusion of all greenhouse gases (rather than 
merely CO2) reduces the cost. Kuik et al., then extend this exercise to derive 
a kind of consensus global cost of carbon that would be needed to achieve 
a range of reduction targets expressed in terms of CO2 concentrations in 
parts per million by volume (ppm). To achieve the long-term target of 450 
ppm of CO2 equivalent, which is more or less consistent with the EU’s 2oC 
warming target,12 the central CO2 price in 2025 could be some €129 per 
 
10  Inclusion of the cost of time to find and absorb information about such actions and the 
associated hassle could reduce the amount of scope at negative cost, however. 
11 The marginal abatement cost is distinct from the marginal damage cost. The latter, 
sometimes referred to as the social cost of carbon, is a measure of the damage done by an 
extra tonne of CO2 emitted. This is the damage of climate change, which is highly 
uncertain, and by contrast it declines as pollution is reduced. Checking it against the 
estimated marginal abatement cost curve would give the theoretical optimum reduction 
and price. Appraisals in the public sector in the UK are required to employ a social cost of 
carbon (DEFRA, 2008).  
12 This approximate temperature rise of 2°C is the IPCC’s Class 1 of scenarios, which 
corresponds to 350-400 ppm of CO2 or 445-490 ppm of CO2-equivalent (Nakicenovic et 
al., 2007). 
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tonne but with a wide range of uncertainty from €69 to €241 per tonne. In 
2050 the price could be €225 per tonne, with a range from €128 to €396 
per tonne. 
Figure 2: Cost and Technical Potentials for Reducing CO2 Emissions in 
the UK  
 
Road Transport in UK – MAC Curve     
 
Residential Sector in UK – MAC Curve 
Source:  Committee on Climate Change, 2008, Figures 6.11 and 7.15.  
 
2. Equal emissions price: Charging everybody the same emissions price 
per unit of CO2e promotes cheapest abatement. Some abatement is 
expensive and should be given less priority. For example, some (not all) 
transport abatement is very expensive. One needs to consider the net 
costs of reducing emissions, which can be high if the benefits of 
transport are high. An equal emissions price has the benefit of not 
encouraging high-cost abatement at the expense of missing out on 
(possibly unknown and even unknowable) low-cost possibilities. People 
who have only high-cost options would pay what is to them the 
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relatively cheaper carbon price instead. Therefore, an equal price needs 
to attach to all carbon emissions, otherwise the cost of action will 
increase significantly. Every emission causes damage and imposes a 
non-zero cost. This “social cost of carbon”, though only possible to 
estimate very approximately and within a wide range, would ideally be 
the set price.13 All should face the cost of emitting otherwise some 
cheap options may be omitted, raising the cost to society as a whole of 
achieving its reductions. Such flexibility should not be confined to be 
within one’s borders. The cheapest abatement projects need to be taken 
on regardless of where they are, given that funds are not limitless. 
3. Minimal negative macroeconomic effect: The levels of reduction 
under consideration for the long term are so large that the issue has to 
be viewed as a macroeconomic one. Subsidies to encourage emissions 
reductions would have to be financed from taxes and taxes have a 
deadweight effect on the economy. Pollution taxes, such as carbon 
levies, too can deflate the economy, but revenues from pollution taxes 
can be used to replace other undesirable taxes and in this way potential 
macroeconomic harm is restrained and may even be overcome. Thus 
“compensating the economy” should not be overlooked. Meanwhile, 
technological developments that are encouraged by pollution taxes 
could be a great boon in reducing the cost of reducing emissions 
(reduce the MAC curve). Given that invention and demonstration 
provide public benefits not captured by the originator, these activities 
are unlikely to be undertaken to their ideal level without government 
support.  
 
In sum, keeping down the cost of reducing emissions has to be a major 
concern. The targets are very demanding and risk being expensive to 
achieve, in macroeconomic terms even. The objective should be to enable 
the people with best knowledge to choose how to change their ways, 
subject to real incentives and without imposing excess net taxation on the 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
13 As described, the “social cost of carbon” is the marginal damage caused by an additional 
tonne of emissions. The range, which is obviously wide, is very sensitive to the 
assumptions underlying the estimations. The optimal price of carbon is that which equates 
with the marginal abatement cost. For estimates of the social cost of carbon, see Tol ( 
2009). 
4. A SURVEY OF 
CLIMATE POLICY 
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO 
IRELAND 
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms should be the 
overarching priority for climate policy in Ireland. Although Ireland’s total 
contribution to international greenhouse gas emissions is miniscule, the 
country could make a worthwhile contribution as a demonstration that 
intelligent policy reform can lead to reduced absolute emissions while 
generating other social and economic benefits.14 But an aggressive 
approach to climate policy in Ireland will be controversial to many 
economic actors, particularly at a time of international financial crisis, 
because climate policy is often associated with additional costs to industry. 
Nevertheless, although reducing emissions raises legitimate questions about 
costs, with appropriate policies there need be no impact on 
competitiveness for the economy as a whole. Even though there may be 
real impacts on limited specific sectors, these sectors (or even individual 
companies) could negotiate a targeted policy approach and need not 
become a brake on national policy. The cost consideration properly 
evaluated may weigh in favour of promoting some domestic emissions 
reduction over international trading. The National Climate Change Strategy 
2007-2012 foresaw an outlay of €270 million to purchase emissions credits 
on the international market, which assumes a permit price of about €15 a 
tonne of CO2e (DEHLG, 2007, pp.17-18); the price of carbon on the EU 
ETS, currently about €13 (July 2009), is volatile but projected to rise by 
2020 and beyond.15 Depending then on the relative cost of abatement at 
home, relying on international trading could represent a saving or a 
growing burden on the national economy. On the other hand, 
implementing cost-effective emissions reductions is in itself a sound 
investment in the future. If Ireland fails to take cost-effective action early in 
the process it could be faced with an increasingly expensive task of 
reducing its emissions later, or purchasing ever larger amounts of emission 
 
14 It is noteworthy that the plastic bag levy (introduced in 2002) has become an 
international icon in environmental policy. Ireland also has little tradition in the type of 
science and engineering that reduces greenhouse emissions but that need not deter 
formulation of sound policy in relevant areas. 
15 Point Carbon, http://www.pointcarbon.com 
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permits.16 The potential costs of inaction to society as a whole must 
therefore be considered alongside the costs of action.  
 
At the same time, adaptation to climate change presents opportunities as 
well as challenges. Climate change policy (whether involving mitigation or 
adaptation) is likely to be disruptive for some sectors, but this does not 
mean that its overall impact will be negative in the long term. Indeed, 
successive European Commission studies have found that tackling climate 
change could have (limited) positive impacts on economic growth and 
employment across the European Union provided that appropriate policies 
are in place, with some important shifts in employment patterns between 
sectors (ETUC 2007, p. 182). Businesses that have low energy requirements 
or deal with the technologies that are suited to a low-carbon economy will 
prosper in a carbon-constrained economy, and Ireland could benefit by 
being among the first movers in this significant area of future economic 
development. 
 
The various policy approaches to address climate change can be divided 
somewhat arbitrarily into several broad categories. The rest of this section 
is a discussion of the pros and cons of the following approaches: 
 
• Legislative. 
• Market- and incentive-based. 
• Standards & regulations. 
• Subsidies. 
• Research & development. 
 
 Irish policymakers must now operate under the assumption that reducing 
emissions is an unavoidable priority. The first objective of climate policy in 
Ireland should, therefore, be to create the necessary political certainty for 
all economic actors that Ireland will be bound by a real carbon constraint. 
One way to provide this certainty would be to enact a legally binding long-
term target, as several jurisdictions have already done. California passed a 
bill in 2006 requiring a reduction in CO2 emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, 
and the UK parliament adopted a similar measure requiring reductions of 
CO2 emissions by 60 per cent by 2050. Reducing Ireland’s emissions by 
2050 to about 11 MtCO2e would equal an approximate 80 per cent 
reduction below Ireland’s 1990 levels, a pro-rata contribution to the overall 
EU target of reducing emissions by 60-80 per cent by 2050. Friends of the 
Earth Ireland proposed a Climate Bill that would oblige the government to 
effect annual reductions in Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions of 3 per cent 
(FoEI, 2007) to lead to reductions of 60 per cent below 1990 levels by 
2050; an 80 per cent target (to about 10 MtCO2e) would require average 
annual cuts of 4 per cent.17  
4.1 
Legislative 
Instruments 
 
An advantage of such a legislative approach is that it presents an 
additional degree of certainty for government departments, private 
businesses and other stakeholders under which to plan future operations. 
 
16 The effects of climate change may also be increasingly felt in Ireland, e.g. water services 
costs. 
17 See Annex 1 for calculations. 
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Furthermore, politicians would be discouraged from postponing some 
politically difficult decisions until after the next election cycle. A system of 
interim (e.g. annual, five-yearly) targets could be strengthened by a 
transparent facility for “borrowing” from future targets, with appropriate 
interest, or “banking” better-than-expected reductions to encourage over-
compliance. The drawback of a legislative approach is that the penalties for 
non-compliance could be difficult to define or enforce. Targets have to be 
informed by the estimated costs to which a country is committing itself and 
abatement costs for large reductions in emissions are likely to be high, 
although possibly tempered by technological developments that may have 
occurred in the meantime. To be credible the negotiating stance of 
interested sectors needs to be backed up by independent research. Costs in 
any event are uncertain and at the same time the nature of the climate 
problem can alter so this too has to be taken into consideration. Inevitably 
such targets are aspirational. To ensure political certainty therefore, a long-
term national target could be set and made to define national actions, 
although this target does not need to have the force of law. 
4.1.1 CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION 
In any case, a target on its own is not a policy. Accompanying measures 
such as an annual carbon budget18 and strategy review will be necessary to 
drive action and, crucially, policy coherence across different government 
departments and agencies. The proposed Climate Change Commission 
foreseen in the National Climate Change Strategy could play an important 
role. The commission would be a new body with the authority to 
“…monitor and assess Ireland’s progress in addressing climate change and 
to increase awareness in all sectors of the opportunities and challenges 
presented by the transition to a low-carbon economy” (DEHLG, 2007, p. 
48). An appropriately resourced commission with the necessary mandate 
and independence could play two useful roles. First, it should undertake a 
continuous review of Ireland’s climate performance, throwing light on 
costs of emissions abatement and effectiveness of policies and measures 
and possible improvements. Second, it could play a role in effecting an 
open and iterative process of policy coordination, including public 
participation and submission and at least partially insulated from political 
interference. This is necessary to generate the level of debate and public 
trust that will be required to bring about the necessary changes, some of 
which could be disruptive to individual sectors of social groups. As part of 
its investigation of abatement costs, the commission could help identify the 
contributions that individual parts of the economy could play and act as a 
clearing house for information to help different actors contribute. No less 
importantly, it could act as a non-partisan source of political pressure to 
help the public determine whether specific policies proposed by any 
government department or authority are consistent with the national 
priority of reducing Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective 
and socially just way. Any such commission would need to complement 
and not duplicate the work of existing bodies working on climate change 
(e.g. the Environmental Protection Agency, Comhar – Sustainable 
 
18 The Programme for Government instituted a carbon budget (p. 19) as a reporting 
mechanism. This is in contrast to the approach outlined in a report by ECOFYS/Friends 
of the Earth United Kingdom, which suggests that the carbon budget could act as an 
instrument for allocating rights to scarce allowances permitted under a legally binding 
national cap (Gilbert and Reece, 2006, p. 15). 
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Development Council and Sustainable Energy Ireland). This could be done 
by including its functions in one of these bodies or providing it with a 
limited but robust mandate that would allow it to compel these other 
bodies to provide it with the necessary information and administrative 
support. 
4.1.2  THE USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FLEXIBLE 
MECHANISMS IN REACHING THE NATIONAL TARGET 
An important question to resolve at the outset is the extent to which 
Ireland should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions through domestic 
policies and measures as opposed to relying on reductions made abroad, 
through the international carbon market. The Kyoto Protocol allows 
countries to trade their emission allocations and also permits the use of two 
project mechanisms – Joint Implementation (JI), which entails projects 
undertaken jointly by industrialised countries, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), consisting of projects funded by developed countries 
but executed in developing countries. Ireland has already decided to 
purchase up to €270 million worth of credits from abroad for the period 
2008-2012 if necessary. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme also allows 
entities to purchase a limited amount of credits from the project 
mechanisms.  
 
In theory, international emission trading provides a flexible way for 
countries or companies to meet their emission targets by allowing them to 
use lower-cost credits from a project that occurs elsewhere. The advantage 
of the project mechanisms is that they can reduce abatement costs by 
providing firms with additional choice and flexibility in reducing emissions. 
Developing countries stand to benefit from the transfer of technology that 
accompanies some projects. In practice, however, these mechanisms face 
practical difficulties in implementation that distance them from the 
theoretical ideal to something closer to nominal compliance. Many projects 
do not cause the abatement of any “additional” carbon emissions – they 
simply award credits to projects that would have happened anyway,19 and 
there are reports of artificial increases in emissions (Wara, 2007). In the 
case of the CDM the majority of project funding goes to just a few 
countries (e.g. China and India) and most projects are large, e.g. the 
elimination of industrial greenhouse gases. Another key difficulty is that the 
carbon benefits of some projects, particularly from afforestation and 
reforestation, are difficult to measure and may not be permanent (the 
forests may be cut down in the future). This is why the European Union 
has excluded credits from forestry, land use and land-use change from the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
 
A critical issue is the absence of carbon pricing for over two-thirds of 
Irish emissions, as the non-ETS emissions are not subject to a carbon tax. 
Therefore, while people gain credits by investing in abatement abroad, 
home owners investing in domestic efficiency measures, for example, do 
not gain from carbon savings relative to their neighbours who do not 
invest. Furthermore, the neighbour can free-ride on the investor’s 
 
19 “Beware the carbon offsetting cowboys”, Financial Times, 26 April 2007. This is not to 
mention the transactions costs including commissions and the creation of a new layer of 
market functionaries. 
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contribution to the national effort. We saw the sort of unexploited 
opportunities that exist in the domestic MAC curve, above, and this is an 
example of the distortions resulting from failure to impose one price to all 
for carbon. 
 
Flexible mechanisms have a role but we note the arguments for 
circumscribing their use. Since lower-cost abatement opportunities may 
exist abroad, restricting mitigation to domestic action could raise costs to 
controlled sectors. But extensive recourse to international trading may not 
be optimal for society as a whole because money spent on credits from 
abroad is lost to Ireland, as are any secondary benefits that would have 
accrued from emission reductions at home (e.g. reduced air pollution 
generally from reduced consumption of fossil fuels). As explained, there are 
lower-cost abatement opportunities in Ireland that current policies do not 
bring about. The principle of “supplementarity”, i.e. a preference for 
domestic abatement over the international flexible mechanisms, is 
enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol;20 it is also reiterated in the EU Directives 
governing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which set out limits on the 
extent to which credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms can 
be used in the scheme.21 Although restricting abatement to domestic 
measures robs third world countries of the benefits of project mechanisms, 
e.g. technology transfer, a more considered use of the project mechanisms 
could help resolve these issues.22 Discriminating in favour of best-practice 
projects using correct prices can help ensure that the benefits of investment 
and technology transfer are shared among more developing countries and a 
range of socially beneficial project types.  
 
The transfer of technology to developing countries is vital. Some 
technologies, such as those that enhance energy efficiency, may diffuse in 
the absence of a targeted policy through the ordinary globalisation process 
of international trade and foreign investments. However, the diffusion of 
specifically climate friendly technologies and the actions of multinationals 
need investigation through research (Popp, 2002). In particular 
encouragement to promoting knowledge spillovers may need extra support 
from developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
20 Article 6.1 (d): “The acquisition of emission reduction units [from project mechanisms] 
shall be supplemental to domestic actions”; Article 17: “Any such trading shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments”. There is no current legal definition or guidance to 
what “supplemental” means in practice, but the possibilities for worthwhile abatement in 
Ireland suggest that a sizeable effort should be through domestic policies and measures.  
21 “The plan shall specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs which may be used 
by operators in the Community scheme as a percentage of the allocation of the allowances 
to each installation. The percentage shall be consistent with the Member State’s 
supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and decisions adopted pursuant to 
the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol.” Directive 2004/101/EC amending Directive 
2003/87/EC, quoted in Grian (2005). 
22 The potential benefit of flexibility is well established and applies broadly. For example, 
within the EU, a first best solution is shown to be a single market for all emissions, that is, 
between agents that are in or outside the EU ETS and between member states, rather than 
to have targets for each of these entities (Tol, 2008). 
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Another potential source of international carbon credits may become 
available in the form of credits from avoided deforestation in tropical 
countries. (This is distinct from afforestation and reforestation.) The 
UNFCCC negotiations are expected to lead to the adoption of a new 
mechanism, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), by which developed countries will compensate 
developing countries for not clearing their forests (and, therefore, 
foregoing the financial benefits that they would have gained from 
exploiting their forests). The mechanism could play a significant role in the 
global climate regime, given that approximately 20 per cent of current 
annual global emissions come from deforestation. Ireland, like other 
developed countries, is likely to benefit from this mechanism, but it should 
be cognisant of potential negative consequences of a mechanism that 
protects forest carbon at the expense of biodiversity or local communities 
that currently rely on the forests (the details of the mechanism have not 
been settled, so such negative outcomes may not materialise). Current 
effort should be directed to promoting the best possible design of the 
REDD mechanism from a broad perspective of sustainable development. 
In line with Ireland’s priorities in official development assistance, once the 
mechanism is in place Ireland should seek to discriminate in favour of 
good-quality REDD projects, as with the other flexible mechanisms. 
 
Given the amount of credits (some of dubious quality) that may be 
available on the international market, a country could be in technical 
compliance with an international commitment without reducing any of its 
own emissions nor, in practice, contributing to any global reduction. To 
rectify this, the government could indicate the manner to which it intends 
to rely on the Kyoto Protocol’s (or any successor treaty) flexible 
mechanisms, as opposed to reducing emissions through domestic policies 
and measures. The government could set conditions for determining the 
level of reliance on foreign abatement measures. Properly explicit costs of 
domestic alternatives would determine the correct use of the flexible 
mechanisms. The government ought to be satisfied that projects under 
flexible mechanisms will be evaluated and ensure that minimum criteria on 
sustainable practices are met. This position needs continuous vigilance 
internationally to encourage countries to drive the market for good-quality 
investment projects. 
 
The issues causing concern are: 
 
1. Additionality: Does the GHG emissions reduction achieved by a 
project constitute additional reductions, i.e. new reductions that 
would not have occurred without the investment? 
 
2. What is the baseline against which to measure this? The baseline 
has to be estimated as it refers to what a facility’s GHG emissions 
would have been without the investment. 
 
This concern has led to an elaborate set of safeguards (Larson et al., 
2008; Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007).  Guidelines  have  been drawn up by the  
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UNFCCC.23 Most aspects with respect to the CDM fall under the 
supervision of host national regulatory agencies and the methodologies 
must be approved on behalf of the UNFCCC by an international 
supervisory group, the CDM Executive Board, with provision for checks to 
be carried out by an independent firm or organisation that has been 
accredited to the Board. The type of project is another controversial issue, 
where industrial plants present the introduction of more efficient fossil-fuel 
based technologies as projects. In the end these may not deliver significant 
reductions in emissions. For the CDM to operate effectively, procedures in 
place have to overcome the challenge posed by the fact that there are 
incentives for both investor and host country to exaggerate the 
environmental benefits of the project.  
4.1.3 DOMESTIC PROJECTS 
Another way of approaching the use of projects to offset emissions 
elsewhere is to look at projects that take place at home. A voluntary offset 
scheme could provide a worthwhile means for government departments 
and agencies as well as individuals to reduce their nominal carbon 
emissions. The provision in the Programme for Government to offset all 
official air travel (Government of Ireland 2007b, p. 20) is welcome if it 
encourages alternatives to travel, rather than merely raises government 
costs, though such encouragement could be minor given that the officials 
concerned do not pay. The beneficiaries in voluntary offset schemes should 
be expanded to include other kinds of projects beyond “urban forests” (as 
proposed in the Programme) and should not be restricted to Ireland. 
Funding domestic projects is potentially a better use of public money than 
purchasing international credits where they are not properly linked to 
verifiable emission reductions.  
 
Even in lieu of any formal domestic project mechanism, however, the 
public sector can play a large role. The government is one of the State’s 
largest economic actors. It is the State’s largest single landlord and tenant 
through its occupation of public buildings and its provision of social 
housing. It maintains a large fleet and has control over many of the State’s 
public transport providers. It has bulk purchasing power. More than many 
private-sector actors, it has the ability to base economic decisions on a 
timeframe of 20 years and longer. In these and other areas the public sector 
should be stating its emissions, attaching a price to them and adopting 
highest standards, consistent with value for money. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Approved baseline and monitoring methodologies are given in http://cdm. 
unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html; for accreditation of certifiers as detailed in Annex 2 
to the report of the CDM Executive Board’s meeting of March 2009 see 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/046/eb46_repan02.pdf, and for the introduction of random 
spot checks (version 9) rather than scheduled inspection of verifiers (designated 
Operational Entities or DOEs) see Annex 3 http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/046/ 
eb46_repan03.pdf. 
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 Market- and incentive-based instruments – particularly fiscal measures 
and emissions trading systems – are intended to put a price on emitting 
carbon. Market-based instruments are particularly appropriate for 
addressing climate change.24 This is because of the varying potential and 
range of costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the incentives that 
such instruments can offer individual actors to reduce emissions, and the 
benefit of dynamic efficiency due to the continuous incentive for the 
adoption of better abatement technologies. As they put a price on 
emissions they have the special advantage of addressing the underlying 
problem, which is that harmful actions are not charged for.  
4.2 
Market- and 
Incentive-
based 
Instruments 
 
But as mentioned, a price currently only applies to about 30 per cent of 
Irish carbon emissions, that is, to the sectors that participate in the EU 
ETS. As already outlined, if the price is not charged to all emitters, 
including small enterprises and households, opportunities to reduce carbon 
emissions will be missed. Without a carbon price, energy-saving measures 
that would have good present values (or paybacks) at that price risk only 
being undertaken by the dedicated. The consequence would be that more 
effort has to be applied in other areas, areas that may be more expensive 
(European Commission, 2007a). A priority for the government is therefore 
to establish a price on all carbon to make energy/carbon-intensive activities 
more expensive relative to other activities. This is most efficiently achieved 
through a domestic carbon tax, as described below. Other fiscal 
instruments under the heading include emissions trading and user pricing, 
especially for road transport.  
4.2.1 CARBON TAXES 
The all-important aspect of a carbon tax is that it can set a long-term 
credible price on emitting carbon. This would provide incentives for 
would-be investors in technical advances and for consumers to switch to 
more energy-efficient heating systems or implement energy-saving 
measures, such as improved insulation. A carbon tax was announced in the 
2007 Programme for Government but has not yet been introduced (as of 
June 2009). Ireland has had good experience with fiscal-type measures. In 
recent years there has been the introduction of payment-by-weight for 
rubbish, which resulted in a reduction of over 30 per cent in one instance 
studied, despite the low price elasticity of demand of -0.27; the introduction 
of metered water charges by group water schemes with up to 40 per cent 
reduction in water use; and the introduction of the plastic bag levy, which 
has reduced consumption of plastic bags by over 80 per cent.25 These 
 
24 The OECD (2008) has simulated stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at 450 ppm CO2 
equivalent over the longer term and found the costs of action to be 0.5 per cent of GDP 
by 2030 and 2.5 per cent by 2050. The policy scenario assumed the introduction of a 
globally-harmonised carbon tax, which is pre-announced so that investors take rational 
decisions. If OECD countries alone implement a carbon tax starting at $25/tonne of CO2 
in 2008, this would lead to a 43 per cent reduction in OECD greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, global emissions would still be 38 per cent higher in 2050 compared to the 2000 
levels. If Brazil, China, India and Russia follow suit with the same policy in 2020, and the 
rest of the world in 2030, global greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 could be brought down 
to the 2000 levels (0 per cent increase). 
25 The fact is often overlooked that a carbon tax would help policies on recycling (Barrett 
and Lawlor, 1995). 
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measures have been especially well-suited to their situations and involved a 
stiff price rise. A carbon tax set at a rate of, say, €20 per tonne of CO2e may 
have a minor initial effect on emissions, but its impact would lie in its long-
run certainty. See Annex 2 for examples of different rates of carbon tax 
applied to the main fuels used. 
 
Carbon taxation, applied as a tax on fuels, can correct the market failure 
arising in energy use by simply charging emitters for the damage done by 
CO2 emitted by combustion. Carbon taxation is a more effective 
instrument for reducing energy-sector CO2 emissions than other kinds of 
taxation on energy per se because it discriminates fairly between energy 
sources according to their greenhouse gas content (Stavins, 1997, p. 9). The 
abatement achieved by carbon taxes and the effect of the tax on the 
economy depend on several factors, including the point of application of 
the tax and what is done with the revenue. Studies undertaken in the 
Economic and Social Research Institute and elsewhere since 1992, shortly 
after the European Commission26 had proposed such an approach, have 
consistently shown that their macroeconomic impact depends on the use to 
which the revenues are put, after low-income households have been helped 
(Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1992; Fitz Gerald et al., 2002; Bergin et al., 2004; 
Conefrey et al., 2008; Scott and Eakins, 2004; Callan et al., 2009). Carbon 
taxation’s impact can be depressing or mildly favourable. The favourable 
result occurs specifically in the case where the bulk of the revenue from a 
carbon tax is recycled to help the economy, through a reduction in taxes on 
labour (e.g. income tax or social insurance contributions). The importance 
of this finding is that it illustrates the fact that climate change policies could 
undermine the economy unless, by reducing labour costs, they address the 
potential setback to Ireland’s competitiveness. Subsequent work has had to 
allow for the fact that the range of application of carbon taxes was reduced 
when the sectors with large emitters joined the EU ETS (see below). But as 
both measures are basically a means of pricing emissions, the logical 
approach is to relate the two prices by, for example, setting the carbon tax 
annually at the permits futures price, suitably constrained to impart 
stability. 
 
Using the revenues to subsidise energy efficiency projects meets with 
popular approval, but needs to avoid the problems associated with 
subsidies, as discussed below. In particular, the cost per tonne abated 
through the subsidy route needs to be explicit. The UK government 
requires electricity suppliers to direct the foregone revenues (these are the 
suppliers’ windfall gains due to the EU emissions trading scheme) to such 
energy saving projects. But this has the added difficulty of incompatible 
incentives. The utility has a long term interest in increasing energy sales, 
not decreasing them. Using gains to reduce energy prices, thereby reducing 
the carbon price, similarly runs counter to policy objectives. 
 
The evidence from other European countries shows that environmental 
taxation, of which carbon taxation is one example, can have a positive 
impact on economic growth and competitiveness (Andersen and Ekins, 
2009). The COMETR research project (Competitiveness Effects of Environmental 
Tax Reforms), funded by the European Commission, found that the 
introduction of carbon or energy taxes with revenue recycling in Denmark, 
 
26 Delbeke (1991). 
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Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland had a positive effect on GDP 
compared with the counterfactual reference case of no environmental tax 
reform (European Commission, 2007b).27 The effect was neutral in the 
case of the United Kingdom (see Figure 3). These results are all the more 
significant, given that the introduction of carbon taxes in these six 
countries was at a very modest level and far from co-ordinated. As the 
European Commission points out, competitiveness is not only an 
economic concern but also an environmental one, because the migration of 
polluting industries to countries with lower standards would not reduce 
global emissions. The COMETR research project found that in the six EU 
Member States that have carried out green tax reforms, “carbon leakage”28 
has been very small and in some cases negative (Barker et al., forthcoming). 
In so far as Ireland’s economic competitors in the European Union also 
introduce such fiscal measures, this would further diminish any harmful 
effects that a domestic carbon tax might have on Ireland’s competitiveness, 
given that most of Ireland’s trading competitors are based within the 
European Union. 
Figure 3: The Effect of Environmental Tax Reform 
Effect on GHG Emissions                              Effect on GDP 
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Source: COMETR (2007); Barker et al. (2009). 
 
An important issue is the effect of carbon taxes on low-income 
households and vulnerable sectors. Carbon taxation would indeed have 
more adverse impacts on individuals and sectors that consume above-
average amounts of energy or are very dependent on solid fuels, the most 
harmful sectors. According to the COMETR project, the sectors most 
vulnerable to a carbon tax would be basic metals and paper and pulp 
industries, whereas cement would be relatively unaffected. Such results help 
to show where special consideration is required. But one of the points of 
such a tax is to provide a long-term signal that could encourage people, 
where possible, to choose less carbon-intensive lifestyles and investments. 
Moreover, the revenues collected can be recycled to help households that 
are disproportionately affected by the increase in fuel prices. This only 
 
27Slovenia was included in this study, though the country only implemented environmental 
tax reform in a limited way. 
28 Carbon leakage is the displacement of the emitting industry from one geographical area 
to one with lax policy, dubbed a “pollution haven”, with no resulting reduction in global 
emissions. It can be a manifestation of competitiveness loss. 
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requires a modest share of the revenues to be set aside for this purpose 
(Scott and Eakins 2004, p. 13; Callan et al., 2009). 
 
Another perceived disadvantage of carbon taxation is that some sectors 
– particularly transport – are relatively insensitive to price rises due to low 
elasticity of demand, especially if there are few alternatives to present 
modes of operating, leading to potentially increased costs and little 
reduction in emissions. Nevertheless, a predictable price signal is likely to 
have an effect on energy demand in such sectors as seen recently in the 
United States, and more so in the long term. The US Congressional Budget 
Office (2008) reported that gasoline price rises in 2008 resulted in 
responses “…large enough to interrupt a pattern of steady growth in 
gasoline consumption dating back to 1990, the last time US gasoline prices 
rose substantially”. During 2003 to 2006 motorists already adjusted their 
driving habits (making fewer trips and driving more slowly). After 
increasing steadily for more than 20 years, the market share of light trucks 
(including SUVs) began to decline in 2004. Persisting high prices are 
expected to cause inefficient vehicles to be replaced with fuel-efficient 
ones. 
 
The generation of additional revenue is a pivotal difference between a 
carbon tax on the one hand and high energy prices caused by external 
factors (and, as seen, free emissions permits) on the other. Another 
difference is that higher energy prices due to a rise in the price of crude oil 
promote development of polluting fuels such as tar sands. The 
effectiveness of a carbon tax will depend on accompanying measures, 
especially for activities with high emissions and a low sensitivity to price 
increases. Regulations, in the form of sound planning rules, parking 
constraints and investment in public transport are some other 
recommended measures. Concern that transport would still be “too high” 
reflects perhaps that other damages are not properly addressed,29 along the 
lines suggested in Efficient Transport for Europe – Policies for Internalisation of 
External Costs (ECMT, now the International Transport Forum, 1998). 
4.2.2 EMISSIONS TRADING 
Emissions trading allows overall emissions from a sector or economy to be 
reduced by a certain specified amount at minimum cost to the economy. 
This is because each participating firm can choose to do what is cheapest 
for it, whether that is to reduce its emissions or purchase additional 
permits, depending on the price. In a cap-and-trade scheme a cap is set 
across the economy or economic sector by a regulator. Permits are 
allocated to participating firms according to a division of the overall cap, 
and firms are obliged to restrain their emissions to their allocation of 
permits or else purchase additional permits. In this way the regulator 
creates a scarcity that in turn creates a carbon price depending on demand 
and the cost of abatement. There are many design options that will affect 
the performance and equity of an emissions trading scheme, including the 
method of allocation (e.g. by auctioning or on the basis of some previous 
level, called grandparenting), the penalties for non-compliance, the 
definition of participating entities and the point at which emissions are 
 
29 Including those due to perverse subsidies. It goes without saying that the objectives of 
any subsidies awarded to fuels can probably be achieved by other means. 
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controlled. The EU ETS (discussed below) controls emissions at a mid-
point of the economy – large-scale industrial users of energy. An alternative 
approach would be to control emissions at the point of energy production 
or importation (“upstream”) or at the point of individual energy 
consumption (“downstream”). An upstream system with auctioned permits 
works like a carbon tax, in that the price of permits (being valuable 
“inputs”) is passed onto consumers. The difference is that the rate of the 
“tax” is variable and not automatically predictable as the price varies 
according to abatement costs and the scarcity of emission permits. Because 
there are quite few entities to control (refineries, fuel importers), an 
upstream system is relatively cheap and simple to administer. A 
downstream system is more complex to administer, with higher transaction 
costs and more regulated entities. 
4.2.3 THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 
Ireland participates in EU ETS, which began operating in 2005 and 
controls emissions mid-stream, that is, from large-scale fixed-source 
emitters, such as large industrial units and power-generating stations 
(European Union, 2004). It covers about 45 per cent of EU greenhouse gas 
emissions (30 per cent of Irish emissions) but omits sectors like transport 
and agriculture. The current trading scheme runs until 2012 and the broad 
rules for the post-2012 scheme were decided as part of the EU Climate and 
Energy Package agreed in December 2008.  
 
A problem (somewhat addressed in the post-2012 phase) is that permits 
in the EU ETS have been allocated almost entirely by grandparenting, 
which gives permits to firms for free depending on their historical 
performance.30 Granting permits for free instead of requiring firms to buy 
them on the market was intended as a way of generating the political 
support for the scheme, but it has led to some perverse outcomes. First, 
grandparenting can reward firms with poor environmental records, since 
they are likely still to have low-cost abatement opportunities that other 
firms may have already exploited (indeed grandparenting may encourage 
poor environmental standards). This issue can be addressed by 
benchmarking allocations against an appropriate performance standard that 
has to be established. Second, allocation for free creates an incentive for 
firms to lobby for the most generous possible allocation. Over-generous 
allocation in the EU ETS contributed to considerable volatility in the 
permit price: the sharp fall in the price of permits (from €29.90 in April 
2006 to €12 in May 2006), triggered by the release of data showing a 
surplus in the market, reflected overly generous allocations by some EU 
Member States to their polluting industries (Convery and Redmond, 2007). 
The price was around €24 (September 2008) falling to a price in the region 
of €10 by February 2009.31 Such volatility undermines the benefit of the 
price signal provided by a carbon market. Third, grandparenting creates 
 
30 During the pilot phase, Member States were allowed to auction up to 5 per cent of their 
total allowance allocation. Only Ireland, Denmark, Hungary and Lithuania have exercised 
this option to any extent (Convery and Redmond, 2007). Ireland auctioned 1 per cent of 
its allocations under the first National Allocation Plan. Despite the apparent success of 
this exercise, only 0.5 per cent of Ireland’s allocations are being auctioned under the 
second National Allocation Plan (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/nap_ 
tables_ireland.pdf) 
31 http://www.pointcarbon.com  
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something close to a free property right that firms will not want to 
relinquish in the future. This is a right to use of the atmosphere, and it is 
similar to other such rights. The experience of milk quotas and taxi and 
liquor licences in Ireland shows how politically difficult it can be to change 
a system in which government-created scarcity increases the value of 
permits and thereby provides an incentive to the permit holder to resist 
socially beneficial change to the permit system. Grandparenting benefits 
incumbents, to the disadvantage of potential new entrants and even clean 
technologies. Fourth, freely allocated permits that can be sold, or where 
their value can be realised through raising prices to consumers, provide an 
effective subsidy to emitting firms. This is the case in the power generation 
sector, where firms are able to pass through prices to consumers (Fitz 
Gerald and Tol, 2007). It may also be a problem in the aviation and 
maritime transport sectors, if they are granted emission permits for free. 
For air travel some other instruments could be considered, e.g. an 
integrated EU air traffic control system (which would reduce emissions), a 
carbon tax or (ultimately) full auctioning of permits in an emission trading 
scheme. 
4.2.4 COST-CONTAINMENT OPTIONS 
In an emissions trading scheme, volatility in the permit price for CO2 
emissions creates uncertainty for producers and complicates their 
investment decisions. If they feel that there is a risk that prices will fall, they 
will fear that their investment in clean technology could become unviable. 
They may feel inclined to invest more effort investigating a deal on fuel 
price than on potential abatement technologies.32 We saw that, for a given 
number of permits available, the market price in the EU ETS at any 
particular time reflects the carbon abatement cost. Fluctuations are to be 
expected depending on the changing circumstances of many agents. A case 
has been made by Helm for containing the price variation by imposing a 
floor and a ceiling on permits prices (Helm, 2008b). Not just a help to 
investors and a guard against a public backlash during oil price spikes, such 
a proposal has an economic rationale. It would enable the price to be 
tailored towards the social cost of carbon and would stabilise prices. When 
or if full auctioning of permits replaces grandparenting such stability will be 
all the more attractive.  
 
A predicable and credible carbon price helps decisions on all sides of the 
market and particularly decisions on emissions reduction. The price 
fluctuations have the advantage of being counter-cyclical, but uncertainty 
and extremes are unhelpful. A floor to the minimum carbon price would 
increase certainty about the long-term value of investments that reduce 
emissions (US GAO, 2008a). The likely profile of prices in the medium-
term is currently far from clear, when one considers that entry of new 
countries into emissions trading in the 2012-2020 period could involve 
some over-generous allocations of permits. An expectation that permit 
prices will fall discourages abatement including recycling, is especially 
discouraging to long-lived investments, and volatility in general imposes a 
real cost. Futures markets can dispel volatility only to a limited extent in a 
regime that is in any case subject to periodic updates.  
 
 
32 As reported by Sorrell et al. (2004). 
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A floor price that bears a relationship to the social cost of carbon could 
remove such uncertainty, and thereby remove the bouts of price 
discouragement to research into renewables and low-carbon technologies. 
A ceiling in its turn would mean that CO2 intensive industries would feel 
less incentive to relocate. Furthermore any energy price shocks to the EU, 
whether induced by external events or internal shortages, that increased 
reliance on coal with concomitant demand-induced rise in the price of 
permits, could strain the will to maintain the system. This would especially 
apply before clean coal technologies in the form of carbon capture and 
storage became available. The floor and ceiling prices would be applied at 
EU level. 
 
A link between oil prices and carbon prices is already found in public 
discussion and the media.33 There is higher resistance to carbon charges 
when oil prices are high. Indeed when high oil prices depress profits, the 
carbon abatement cost from reducing output, in terms of foregone profits, 
is low. Or expressed differently, at high oil prices, the price of carbon does 
not need to be very high to entice producers to reduce their emissions. 
Conversely, other things being equal, when oil prices are low profits are 
high, and altering the level of activity to reduce emissions sees large 
foregone profits. The carbon price would then need to be high to entice 
producers to reduce their emissions. We are talking in terms of these 
actions relative to each other. The implications are that the floor and ceiling 
on the permit price should be indexed inversely to the oil price. This would 
suit both producers and households (Helm, 2008b). 
 
The means by which the floor price could be ensured are apparently 
straightforward. When the permit price falls below the floor a carbon tax 
could be activated to make up the difference. Another route would be for 
governments to buy back permits to raise their price, like central banks’ 
open market operations, or “carbon market operations” in this case. If the 
permit price rose above the ceiling price, a negative carbon tax (a rebate) 
could be triggered. Among other possibilities is the option of allowing 
more CDM projects from developing countries. The broadening of the EU 
ETS requires consideration of such facilities in any event.  
 
Any such decision to impose a price floor or ceiling would need to be 
taken at EU level, given that the EU ETS is managed by the European 
Commission. One argument against such measures is that price floors or 
ceilings could complicate any attempt to link the EU ETS to trading 
schemes in other parts of the world, which the European Commission has 
identified as a desirable next step towards a global carbon market 
(European Commission, 2009, p. 11). Any measures to contain costs would 
need to be compatible with the broader goal of expanding the carbon 
market. The scope for gaming between markets would also need to be 
addressed. 
 
 
33 Keenan (2008), in the Irish Independent put it thus: “To will the end, but not the means, is 
a common human condition… No one should have any doubt that dearer petrol, 
electricity, etc. is indeed the means by which carbon emissions will be cut. The question is 
whether governments should try to smooth what could otherwise be a highly disruptive 
series of booms and busts in both oil prices and economies.” See also Gibbons (2008).  
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4.2.5 INDIVIDUAL CARBON TRADING 
Individual carbon trading provides a form of emissions trading applied at 
the level of the individual: the ultimate expression of a downstream 
approach to a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme. Individual carbon 
trading is based on the idea that the Earth’s atmosphere is a common 
resource and each individual is entitled to an equal share of the benefits, 
that is, the benefits of being able to engage in activities like driving and 
heating that use the atmosphere’s waste assimilation service. Under 
individual carbon trading everyone is given a limited allowance to cause 
CO2 emissions, thereby allowing total emissions to be controlled while 
giving people an incentive – through the price signal and the ability to sell 
any unused emission permits – to reduce their emissions in their everyday 
consumer decisions. Everyone would be given an initial allowance, with the 
information stored centrally and perhaps on an individual credit card, and 
they would be required to retire equivalent credits whenever they make a 
carbon-emitting purchase, such as for petrol. The overall cap could be 
tightened over time and the price of individual emission permits would rise 
according to demand, or fall as cheaper technical solutions to abatement 
emerged. 
 
Several models have been proposed with various design approaches to 
the practical issues posed by individual carbon trading, including tradable 
energy quotas, domestic tradable quotas and personal carbon allowances 
(Roberts and Thumin 2006, pp. 12-14). There are many uncertainties 
related to the political acceptability and economic impacts of such schemes 
and to their administrative complexity. “Cap and Share”, a proposal 
developed by the Irish think tank Feasta, is a comparable approach to 
individual carbon trading but with a more upstream focus that requires 
fossil-fuel suppliers, rather than households, to surrender permits 
corresponding to their fuels supplied. Each resident or household receives 
an annual “entitlement” to an equal share of the overall cap in the form of 
certificates. Households can sell the certificates via an intermediary (banks 
or post offices) for selling on to fossil-fuel suppliers. These suppliers are in 
turn obliged to buy entitlements equivalent to the emissions from the fuels 
that they supply (Feasta, 2007). Unlike the individual carbon trading 
schemes outlined above, in Cap and Share the resident is not obliged to 
purchase additional entitlements if his or her annual activities cause 
additional emissions. Rather, the system causes the scarcity to lead to 
higher fuel prices (since the suppliers will pass on the cost of certificates via 
the cost of fuel to consumers), with the result that average users sell their 
entitlement for the same amount as their annual energy bills rise. Those 
who consume less energy than average will be better off, and those who 
consume more energy than the average will be worse off.34 In this way the 
system acts like a carbon tax with a variable rate, with the revenues recycled 
via the intermediary to consumers.  
 
34  This is not strictly the case in the version analysed by Cambridge Econometrics (2008). 
The scheme covers the whole non-ETS sector, which includes businesses as well as 
households. The businesses in the version modelled by Cambridge Econometrics, while 
paying the carbon price on fuels, do not receive certificates in compensation. Meanwhile 
all households rather than just average households appear to gain (Table 4.7). This is 
because they are receiving the businesses’ share of certificates. However, the carbon price 
passed on by businesses will erode some of the household sector’s seeming gain, and the 
businesses themselves could be at a disadvantage. 
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The advantage of Cap and Share is that it could be effective, and 
(perhaps) simple to administer and politically acceptable. Because fossil-fuel 
importers or refiners are small in number and are currently covered by the 
excise duty regime, they can be easily monitored, so administration costs 
could be low. Fossil-fuel importers will then pass on the additional cost of 
buying permits to consumers in the form of higher fuel prices. All 
consumers are incentivised to use less, and although this effect may be 
small in the short-term if the elasticity of demand is low (see above), the 
longer-term effect may be strong if the annual cap is seen to be enforceable 
and increasingly restrictive in a predictable way. The scheme could be 
politically acceptable because the revenue goes via the intermediary to 
residents and not to the government.  
 
A criticism of the Cap and Share proposal is that recycling the revenues 
effectively to individuals fails to “compensate the economy”. The economy 
is disadvantaged by the high carbon price. In the case of carbon taxes, this 
can be more than overcome by directing revenues instead to reduce labour 
costs (by reducing social insurance contributions and income taxes) and 
thereby helping competitiveness. Using all revenue from taxes or 
auctioning to compensate households is less beneficial (Bergin et al., 2004; 
Conefrey et al., 2008) and the same would apply to Cap and Share.35 There 
is also the risk that the scheme could allow rent-seeking behaviour if fuel 
suppliers are able to hoard fuel and sell for a profit during times of scarcity. 
Finally, any possible transaction costs should be factored into the design of 
the scheme: the experience of the all-island electricity market shows that 
transaction costs can generate large and unforeseen expense that could 
undermine the efficiency of the scheme. In terms of environmental 
effectiveness, an area where Cap and Share (and other individual carbon 
trading schemes) could be considered is for the transport sector, where 
carbon taxes might be a politically unpopular way to reduce emissions. A 
point to note is that abatement costs in transport vary widely between 
persons, whereas each tonne of CO2 is equally damaging. If reducing 
emissions from transport is relatively costly in the ranked list of abatement 
actions then the priority attached to transport should be accordingly lower. 
However, superior policies may be available, including justified provisions 
of public transport and other measures such as improved spatial planning. 
4.2.6 USER PRICING (TRANSPORT SECTOR)  
The effectiveness of carbon taxation, at least in the short term, will be 
minimal where the price elasticity of demand is low. This will be the case 
where people use capital equipment that cannot be changed immediately. A 
prominent example in Ireland’s case is transport. Road transport is already 
heavily taxed in Ireland, as elsewhere in Europe: German excise duty on 
petrol in 2006 was the equivalent of €275.20/tonne CO2 equivalent 
(Convery and Redmond, 2007; Parry and Small, 2005). This is a multiple of 
carbon trading levels, although it should be noted that transport not only 
burns fuel but also imposes other external costs of road use (including air 
pollution, road wear, water-course pollution, severance of habitat, not to 
mention congestion and noise). There is a low elasticity of demand for 
 
35 Under the carbon levy only a share of revenue would be used and targeted at vulnerable 
households (Scott and Eakins, 2004; Callan et al., 2009). 
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private motor transport in the short term.36 An additional carbon tax of, 
say, €20/tonne CO2, which would add just 4.22 per cent to the price of 
petrol (2006 figures) would, therefore, most likely not have a discernible 
impact on demand for travel and might bring few short-term benefits. Not 
pricing the externalities, however, means that the long-term benefits cannot 
be reaped and these could be significant. There are gains to be had by user 
charges, if mainly in the long run.  
 
A more effective approach to transport emissions could be to charge all 
modes of transport directly, that is, as they drive, according to their total 
external social, economic and environmental costs, as recommended in 
recent reports to the UK and Irish governments.37 Possible demand-side 
measures include congestion pricing and road pricing. A national road-
pricing scheme that would charge users per kilometre driven, depending on 
location and time of day, is actively under consideration in the Netherlands 
with a view to nationwide implementation by 2016.38 Availability of other 
alternatives such as public transport, correctly assessed, have a major role. 
4.2.7 BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
The threat to competitiveness from cheap “dirty” imports and fears about 
carbon leakage due to industries relocating abroad are often raised as 
objections to charges on carbon emissions. Under “free” trade, polluting 
industries that are subject to domestic carbon charges could be drawn to 
countries with lax environmental policies. These countries offer what 
amounts to a comparative advantage, in the form of “havens” for polluters. 
Other policies, for example direct standards such as emission standards, 
have cost implications too and thus affect competitiveness. 
 
Where revenues from carbon charges have been recycled to reduce 
other taxes, the effects need not be harmful at national level (see above, the 
COMETR study and ex ante analyses of carbon taxes (Conefrey et al., 
2008)). Nevertheless, a few energy-intensive sectors – those revealed as 
having limited market power because they trade at world level – may 
require special attention. It would be pointless to cause such sectors to flee, 
only to set up abroad and continue polluting. Several studies have found 
statistically significant, though minor, pollution haven effects. Others have 
produced inconclusive results,39 which is not surprising given the difficulty 
of disentangling the many factors, including proximity to growing markets, 
that influence location decisions. Such mixed findings highlight the 
 
36 It is sometimes claimed mistakenly that high fuel prices (e.g. in 2008) “show” that price 
has no effect, without regard to what demand would have been. In addition, elasticities are 
sometimes understated. Price-induced technological improvements are not unlearned in 
price downturns and this can reduce the measured price-demand effect. 
37 Eddington Transport Study (2006) and Oscar Faber (2000). 
38 “Road-use charge to reduce Dutch traffic jams”. Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 1 
December 2007. http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/071201-dutch-traffic- 
mc , see also study of mileage tax (Carroll-Larson and Caplan, 2009). 
39 Studies supporting the pollution haven hypothesis, if to a small degree, are seen in 
papers by Levinson (1996); van Beers and van den Bergh (1997); List and Co (2000); 
Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2004). Studies showing that 
environmental policies had a favourable impact on competitiveness include papers by 
Berman and Bui (1999) and Kind et al., (2002). A study by the IEA (2008) on the effect of 
the EU ETS on energy intensive industries to date did not find conclusive evidence of 
carbon leakage in affected sectors. 
  A SURVEY OF CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO IRELAND 29 
desirability of inducing host countries, via agreements, to strengthen their 
environmental policies, and of co-ordinating global environmental rules 
(Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2004). 
 
Border Tax Adjustments are one possible solution, if permitted. They 
would consist of a tax on the pollution generated in the manufacture of 
imports coming into Ireland. By subjecting these imports to the same level 
of carbon taxes that were imposed in Ireland, the playing field is levelled. 
Similarly, if Ireland’s exports to those countries were shown to be at a 
disadvantage owing to the carbon prices levied here in the course of their 
manufacture, they could receive an adjustment on export in the form of a 
tax relief or rebate. Such adjustments to the price at borders would apply to 
a few highly carbon-intensive sectors that trade on the world market and 
are revealed to be price-takers. Sectors such as cement that tend not to be 
price-takers may not need protection by border tax adjustments while steel, 
for example, might need protection of some sort (HM Treasury, 2006; Fitz 
Gerald et al., 2009). The vast bulk of sectors are not sufficiently affected by 
charges on carbon to impact on their competitiveness. Border Tax 
Adjustments have already been applied in the US in the form of 
environmental excise taxes. A relevant instance was the Ozone-Depleting 
Chemicals Tax. This tax aimed to harness market forces in finding 
substitutes for the taxed chemicals, and their production was apparently 
discouraged by the tax in an effective manner (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004). 
 
A border tax for Ireland would not be applied unilaterally but as part of 
an EU-wide application.40 It could be levied on vulnerable sector products 
from countries that do not take part in an emissions trading scheme or do 
not put a price or other obligation on their producers to reduce carbon 
emissions. But there is currently little appetite for such measures at the EU 
level, from both the European Commission, which fears that it could lead 
to a trade war, and industry, which fears an increase in the cost of imported 
materials. The EU Climate and Energy Package adopted in December 2008 
does not include border taxes except as a measure that might be adopted in 
the future as a possible alternative to the preferred outcome, which is a 
globalised carbon market via (for instance) an international carbon tax or a 
cap and trade scheme with auctioned permits operating at world level.41 In 
the meantime, competitiveness impacts are addressed through free 
allocation of emission permits to industries that are able to prove that they 
are exposed to leakage, according to a methodology to be agreed in 2010 
(European Parliament 2008). On the other hand, the Waxman-Markey bill 
for a comprehensive US policy on climate change passed on 26 June 2009 
includes border measures, if the President and Congress by joint resolution 
find that the preferred measure of providing rebates to affected companies 
fails to offset competitiveness impacts (US House of Representatives 
2009). 
 
 
 
40 The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the customs union. External tariffs are set by the 
European Union rather than the Member States and there can be no tariffs on intra-EU 
trade, and thus no border tax adjustments either. Note that the bulk of Irish imports and 
exports are from and to other EU countries. 
41 Though operating internationally, revenues would accrue to national governments 
except insofar as an agreed share is used to avert deforestation, for example. 
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The legality of the issue hinges on whether such Border Tax 
Adjustments for carbon charges would comply with the rules of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). According to the rules, as long as there is no 
discrimination, the same taxes as those applied domestically can be 
imposed on like imported products, and a rebate of taxes can be awarded 
on exported domestic products. This kind of border tax reflects the 
application of the destination principle to products: products should be 
taxed in the country where they are consumed and not in the country 
where they are produced, unless they are also consumed there. Clearly, such 
adjustments are intended to ensure that internal taxes on products are 
trade-neutral.42 The situation is more complex when the imported good is 
not the item that is taxed, but the energy or carbon emissions associated 
with the good’s production are taxed. These are the emissions that are 
embodied or embedded, or the virtual emissions, in the product. To level 
the playing field, the energy or carbon embodied in the production of the 
imported steel, say, would need to be ascertained and verified – and the tax 
would need to be the same as on domestically produced steel.  
 
The OECD argues that Border Tax Adjustments should be used as a 
last resort only, because BTAs could violate WTO rules and may lead to 
trade retaliation. For now, the OECD recommends that the focus be on 
achieving participation by all major emitting countries and sectors in an 
international agreement on emission reduction (Gurría, 2008). The 
European Commission likewise suggests exploring the options for allaying 
the competitive disadvantage of charges on carbon. The Commission cites 
possible internal or external solutions. An internal solution could entail 
differentiating the instrument applied to the vulnerable sector, among other 
possibilities. For example, carbon-intensive sectors could continue to 
receive free allowances as noted above. A possible disadvantage there is 
that entities could sell the allowances and relocate anyway and therefore 
agreements would need to be reached, perhaps with technical upgrades 
thrown in (US GAO, 2008b). With respect to possible external solutions, 
important elements that need to be resolved include WTO compatibility, 
retaliation, and the energy and carbon efficiency. The Commission notes 
that investments being made in emerging economies, often by European 
companies, could in any event be using state of the art clean technology. If 
no global agreement is reached for a post-2012 framework the EU might 
consider the possible use of border tariffs to equalise the effective “tax” on 
carbon in traded goods coming into and exported out of Europe. It will 
make proposals, at the latest by 2011 (Delbeke, 2008). However, as a 
substantial part of carbon emissions are not priced by a straight-forward tax 
but by a cap-and-trade system with some free permits, any border tax 
adjustment is likely to be challenged as being discriminatory. Much work 
would need to be done to flesh out these arrangements, but in the view of 
Nordhaus (2007) carbon tax and border adjustments are familiar terrain 
because countries have dealt with problems of tariffs, subsidies, and 
differential tax treatment for many years. “The (tax) issues are elementary 
compared to those of a quantity-based regime” he adds.  
 
42 This too has a precedent in the US with the Superfund Tax that was designed to place 
the burden of chemical clean-up in the US on those responsible for generating the wastes. 
Tax rates based on the US production were adopted by the US Secretary of the Treasury 
as the approach for the tax on imported chemicals (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004.). 
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The practicalities of border tax adjustments are briefly described as 
follows. According to one proposal, the level of tax on an imported 
product could be calculated as the additional costs of carbon permits 
incurred on procurement during production of the domestic equivalent 
product, using best available technology (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004). The 
proposers claim that this would limit possible distortions and could be 
compatible with WTO constraints. They say that the crucial features are 
simplicity, which would be achieved by focusing on the CO2 emissions 
caused by processed materials, and a separate treatment of electric energy 
input to take account of regionally varying fuel mixes. Of course, the tax 
could be less clear when the imports embody carbon that has been 
permitted for free in a cap and trade system. There is another uncertainty 
relating to the requirement that all “like” products be treated the same. If 
“like” applies to the final product, countries with carbon-intensive exports 
facing taxes on their embodied carbon might claim discrimination, which is 
why the destination principle could be the easier approach.  
 
For Ireland, once these issues were settled such calculations of 
embodied carbon can be made by looking at the supply chain using Input-
Output analysis, as reported in the section on trends, above. 
 
In addition to arguing that a border tax can be compliant with GATT as 
in the suggested version above, Weber and Peters point to a second avenue 
that a country might use. That is, a country might simply admit that the 
border tax is incompatible with GATT and claim an exception through 
Article XX of GATT. Exceptions for environmental reasons are allowed. 
The article states that measures relating to “conservation of natural 
resources” or out of necessity to “protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health” are allowed if they are made in parallel with similar actions 
domestically (World Bank, 2007; Weber and Peters, 2009). The two 
precedents here have been controversial. Article XX was successfully used 
to block Canadian exports of asbestos intensive construction materials to 
France, and to block imports of shrimp to the US that had been caught by 
using nets that were harming turtles. If other WTO members were 
attempting to pass measures on climate policy that would invoke Article 
XX it may be easier to prove legality (Weber and Peters, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, the optimal solution for potential conflicts between WTO 
members would be to make the adjustment unnecessary. The 
harmonisation of emissions pricing across countries would eliminate 
grounds for border tax adjustments in the first place. Logically, the WTO 
should be rectifying the absence of carbon price (or similar), which, as 
already stated,  effectively  constitutes  a  subsidy  for  exports and an unfair  
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practice, a description forcefully employed by Stiglitz (2006).43 Such an 
internationally harmonised approach seems unlikely for now. 
 
Alternatively, Weber and Peters suggest that in the short term “…the 
effectiveness of using the global trade network as a ‘carrot’, through 
technology sharing, collaborative research, global sectoral agreements, and 
freeing trade in environmental goods, may outweigh the effectiveness of 
coercive ‘sticks’”. They seem to imply that many sectors and not just 
carbon-intensive sectors would be affected and, in contrast to Stiglitz, they 
highlight the methodological and confidentiality concerns arising in 
calculating the carbon embodied in the vulnerable goods (i.e. primary 
goods apart). More importantly, they stress the present need to engage all 
countries in policy and, with self-serving behaviour in evidence, the mere 
perceived intent of border taxes may deter co-operation overall. Efforts to 
achieve such co-operation, they suggest, should include improving 
accounting for the carbon inventories by using the consumption based 
approach (for international transport included), or extending emissions 
trading-cum-CDM to bottom-up approaches, such as global sectoral 
agreements. (But note this could reduce the benefits of simplified targets, 
discussed above under the section on international project mechanisms.) In 
addition to massive amounts of capital to finance diffusion of green 
technologies, reduction of barriers to diffusion is also called for by the 
authors. They say this is not to deny the role of carbon tariffs in avoiding 
non-compliance in climate change mitigation policy in the long term. But 
the benefits of global cooperation are large and border taxes should not be 
allowed to impede it in any way. 
 
 The use of direct government intervention through technical measures – 
such as regulations mandating appliance efficiency levels or the use of 
specific technologies – is often a cruder instrument than incentive-based 
measures. The state may be guided by political preferences rather than 
questions of economic efficiency or effectiveness when it chooses a 
particular technology as a response to climate change; governments are 
often poor predictors of technologies, simply because they are not 
omniscient. Technological developments would benefit from a guaranteed 
price of emissions, as technology has been bedevilled by uncertain carbon 
price up until now. Nevertheless, there are many cases that do call for 
direct government intervention or a mixture of instruments rather than 
leaving things to the market, especially in cases of clear market failure. For 
example, there are economies of scale in the provision of information in 
the area of energy efficiency. Savings are possible but many opportunities 
for reduced consumption remain hidden or otherwise unexploited. 
4.3 
Standards 
and 
Regulations 
 
43 While the US was refusing to sign up to action on climate change, Stiglitz argued for a 
global enforcement mechanism, involving import prohibition or border taxes, to prevent 
any country from inflicting harm on the rest of the world. Citing the precedents, he stated 
that the principle that global environmental concerns could trump narrow commercial 
interests was sustained by the WTO. Biermann and Brohm (2005) also see world trade law 
probably permitting tax adjustments, despite uncertainties. Manders and Veenendaal 
(2008) meanwhile show that Stiglitz’s proposal is unlikely to be effective as an 
enforcement mechanism. Though mitigating the generally modest negative effects of 
unilateral climate policy by the EU, the pain inflicted on non-EU regions by border trade 
measures would “not seem to be effective in persuading non-abating countries to join a 
climate change regime”.  
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Reduced demand for energy or carbon-intensive fuels will be essential if 
Ireland is to move towards its long-term target (Fitz Gerald et al., 2008).  
4.3.1 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Energy efficiency provides much scope for reducing emissions according 
to the estimate that at least 20 per cent of energy in the European Union is 
wasted (European Commission, 2006). The European Commission has 
defined an Action Plan with about 75 measures that can be taken to 
increase energy efficiency in appliances, buildings, electricity generation and 
the transport sector. Ireland could exploit some of these measures 
aggressively where they are the lowest-cost opportunities for reducing 
emissions. The energy saving potential of buildings in the European Union 
is estimated at 28 per cent and there is particular scope for savings in the 
public sector, where users of buildings generally do not have the incentive 
to use energy efficiently.  
 
Early action on energy efficiency could be worthwhile, e.g. through the 
unilateral imposition of efficiency standards up to the cost-effective limit44 
for all buildings, regardless of size. Other measures include incentives for 
the development of passive houses, which rely on very good insulation 
levels and passive heating and mechanical ventilation rather than traditional 
heating systems, as well as measures to raise the efficiency of energy 
transformation, for instance by promoting Combined Heat and Power and 
district-heating schemes in urban areas. Vigorous assessment of the 
outcomes would inform the setting of standards. In addition, the appraisal 
of infrastructure projects such as foreseen under Transport 21 and the new 
Programme for Government should involve cost-benefit analysis to take 
into account the external costs and benefits of proposed projects including 
their impact on greenhouse-gas emissions. The correct share of public 
transport infrastructure options needs to be assessed in this manner. 
4.3.2 SPATIAL PLANNING 
Spatial planning and its consistent, effective implementation is a crucial 
policy area to address because of the long-term impact that settlement 
patterns will have on greenhouse gas emissions. This calls for a radical 
overhauling of Ireland’s planning regime, which has to date led to the 
haphazard development of rural and peri-urban areas, and in turn has 
locked a growing proportion of the population into energy-intensive 
commuting patterns. Higher density need not imply unsightly heavy-
handed developments, provided that they are designed with communities 
in mind (European Environment Agency, 2006).  
4.3.3 ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM RENEWABLE 
SOURCES 
The Programme for Government foresees that at least one third of 
electricity consumed in Ireland will be generated from renewable sources 
by 2020 (Government of Ireland, 2007b, p. 16). This target is both 
ambitious and important if Ireland is going to meet its national emission 
targets. Political predictability is needed in this area because of the long 
investment horizon of the sector: generating stations typically have 
 
44 Costing in the external costs and benefits, as by Brophy et al. (1999). 
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lifespans of about 20 years or more and distribution networks have 
lifespans of about 45 years (Deloitte and Touche, 2005, p. 8). 
 
Ireland has enormous and largely untapped resources of renewable 
energy. A 1997 study estimated that wind power could generate around 345 
TWh per year, about 19 times the current electricity production of the ESB 
system, with the cost rising with the extent of penetration (ESBI/ETSU 
1997). The recent grid study45 shows that the type of grid is significantly 
different and more expensive if 6000 MW, rather than 4000 MW, of wind 
is to be accommodated. In the short term, however, the potential of 
renewable energy will not be realised without government support. Many 
new renewable energy technologies are relatively expensive because they 
are in their infancy. The structure of the electricity grid itself also imposes 
barriers to the wider deployment of renewable electricity. Irish electricity is 
structured around a number of large base-load plants, mainly combined-
cycle gas turbine. Such plant has high capital costs, runs continuously at 
high output and is well suited for providing the electricity market with a 
guaranteed minimum supply, but it is inefficient when operated at part 
load, and it is expensive to start up and shut down and, therefore, inflexible 
and unresponsive to fluctuating demands. According to some estimates, 
there is more than double the required amount of base-load plant in 
Ireland to satisfy minimum system demand (O’Connor, 2006). This 
inappropriate generation mix has developed in response to rather crude 
market incentives rather than strategic planning.  
 
The government could facilitate high penetration of wind energy (e.g. 30 
per cent) by encouraging the deployment of open cycle gas turbine stations, 
which have a relatively low capital cost and provide the flexibility to 
balance the energy system when the wind drops (ESRI/EPA, 2004, p. 17). 
The most important and long-term challenge, however, will be to reorient 
the grid itself to allow the accommodation of greatly increased amounts of 
dispersed, often small generators of electricity from renewable energy 
sources (SEI, 2004, p. 20). “Embedded” or “distributed” generation is 
electricity generated in small-scale units that are connected to regional 
electricity distribution networks. Properly designed, a grid based on 
embedded generation could reduce greenhouse gases through improved 
efficiency and the accommodation of electricity from renewable sources 
while bringing additional benefits of improved security of supply, through 
fuel diversity and a more flexible grid that is less prone to blackouts 
(Goodbody Economic Consultants, 2002, p. 70). In Ireland there is much 
potential for flexible and new technologies such as modular combined cycle 
gas turbine, open cycle gas turbine, combined heat and power (large-scale, 
mini and micro) and fuel cells to be included in a national system of 
distributed generation. Micro-generation, which includes such technologies 
as domestic solar panels, brings embedded generation closest to the point 
of use. Combined Heat and Power (CHP, or the simultaneous production 
of electricity and usable heat, also known as cogeneration) would likewise 
benefit from a restructured grid. Though not necessarily based on 
renewable energy sources, CHP could also reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by improving the efficiency of electricity conversion. The 
creation of a flexible electricity grid that accommodates major penetration 
 
45 http://www.eirgrid.com/EirGridPortal/uploads/Announcements/EirGrid%20 
GRID25.pdf 
  A SURVEY OF CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO IRELAND 35 
of embedded generation will not happen without government intervention, 
however. For instance, it is often impossible for technical reasons to 
connect micro-generation and small-scale electricity generation to the 
electricity network. 
 
A reorientation of the national grid to accommodate widespread 
renewable and micro-generated electricity would allow a large increase in 
the penetration of low-carbon forms of electricity generation, including 
micro-generation. This depends on a strong policy of technical intervention 
by government and the relevant authorities and is the subject of ongoing 
analysis. Such an intervention would not be to choose any specific 
technologies but rather to provide an environment in which many different 
kinds of technologies, including low-carbon ones, can compete. Such 
intervention could be justified because of the potential benefits and due to 
the national importance of the grid infrastructure. Short-term measures 
could include the introduction of a simplified protocol for connection to 
the grid and the introduction of smart metering, which would also promote 
energy efficiency by encouraging consumers to regulate their electricity 
consumption according to its price. Additional investment in 
interconnectors would also hedge against variability in output and allow 
Ireland to export as well as import electricity. In practice this can be less 
responsive depending on pricing arrangements which entail flows being 
determined one week ahead, for example. All these measures come at a 
cost. Nuclear power is unlikely to play a role in the generating mix without 
some government intervention, and a decision about any such intervention 
should be dependent on cost. Naturally nuclear energy should not be 
exempt from paying for its own particular external impacts such as end-of 
life, nuclear waste, monitoring and security costs that need to be factored 
in. Clarity on storage costs and site availability is required to indicate 
whether or not the end-of-life expenses could be more onerous than 
suggested. Ultimately customers need to bear such costs (Helm, 2008c). 
The choice of fuel used to generate electric power will become more 
important with the increasing number of plug-in hybrids and all-electric 
cars on the Irish roads. If such cars are connected to a smart grid, their 
batteries could serve to stabilise power supply and allow for a greater 
penetration of variable and unpredictable energy sources such as wind, 
wave and solar power (DECNR, 2006). 
4.3.4 NUCLEAR ENERGY (DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED) 
For reasons of investor security and the risk (though small) of a radioactive 
accident, a nuclear power station could not be built without government 
guarantees. As mentioned, in order to avoid inconsistent treatment of 
pollution, the costs of dealing with the waste and security would need to be 
factored in to the price of the electricity generated. Given that a nuclear 
power station takes about ten years to build, and no station has been 
proposed in Ireland, nuclear power is unlikely to play a significant role in 
Ireland’s electricity mix (apart from some imported electricity) for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
A pertinent objection to nuclear power is that it is the opposite of the 
kind of plant that is needed for the Irish electricity system. Nuclear power 
is currently not very economic in units below 700-800 megawatts, and its 
use would be limited to base-load plant, of which there is already a surfeit 
in Ireland (Bolger 2007; Lyons et al., 2007). There may also be a trade-off 
between a centralised system that is made up of a small number of large 
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generating stations and a more flexible, decentralised system made up of a 
large number of small generating stations, many of which would be based 
on renewable resources like wind or biomass and would be closer to the 
point of electricity use, as described above (Mitchell and Woodman, 2006). 
Finally, it is necessary to examine nuclear power’s opportunity costs. 
Nuclear power is not currently cost competitive with other forms of 
electricity (although a 2003 MIT report suggested that nuclear power might 
be price competitive if the price of carbon rises to about $50-200/ton 
carbon: Ansolabehre et al., 2003) and generally requires direct or indirect 
public support. The benefits of spending public money on a nuclear power 
station should be compared to the gains to be achieved by investing in 
energy efficiency or in non-technology specific measures like promoting a 
decentralised grid that accommodates embedded generation from a variety 
of different technologies. (These comparisons are facilitated through 
estimates for the schedule of marginal abatement costs.) 
4.3.5 CARBON-INTENSIVE ELECTRICITY GENERATION: COAL 
AND PEAT 
Besides peat, coal produces the highest proportion of greenhouse gases of 
any fuel, and large energy users are regulated by the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which puts a cost on carbon and raises their electricity prices. The 
replacement of Moneypoint generating station with a gas-fired station 
would improve environmental performance, but this option has been 
rejected by the government to reduce over-reliance on gas and maintain 
diversity of energy supply. The environmental impact of coal could be 
reduced by CO2 sequestration (also known as carbon capture and storage), 
a technology that is still far from being cost effective at current carbon 
prices. Peat is an indigenous source of energy that provides local 
employment, but its extraction can destroy ecological habitats and it emits 
even more CO2 than coal. One solution would be to replace peat – and, 
eventually, other fuels – with biomass, which would retain the social 
benefits of local employment that are gained by using peat while also 
boosting the use of a renewable source of energy with fewer environmental 
impacts. However, even supplying 30 per cent of the current fuel used in 
peat stations with biomass would be likely to entail large imports. 
 
The future viability of coal as a generating fuel in a climate change 
context depends on the afore-mentioned nascent technology of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS). The feasibility of ambitious climate targets may 
depend on the successful development of CCS as a cost-effective way of 
dealing with carbon emissions from coal, given the massive share of global 
electricity that coal provides (half of all electricity generation in the United 
States comes from coal) and its likely role in the future, given large global 
coal stocks. CCS refers to any process by which the CO2 from coal 
combustion is captured from point sources like power stations and large 
factories, compressed into liquid form, transported to a suitable location 
and placed in permanent storage. Subterranean geological features are 
considered suitable for storage for many centuries with minimal risk of 
seepage and it could be based on the decades-old practice of injecting 
liquid into petroleum fields to increase oil recovery. The problem today is 
that CCS is an experimental process based on a complex stream of 
processes many of which depend on infant technologies. Demonstration 
projects reveal that CCS costs between $50 and $100 per tonne of CO2 
sequestered; this adds between $0.04 and $0.08 to the price of a kilowatt 
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hour of electricity (Fernando et al., 2008). CCS will, therefore, raise costs to 
consumers of electricity without providing any obvious co-benefits apart 
from reduced carbon emissions (the process of generating electricity by 
burning coal remains essentially unchanged). There may also be public 
resistance to CCS for several reasons including its cost, its “validation” of 
the continued use of coal for electricity generation, and the risks to 
ecosystems and human health from an accidental leakage of the captured 
CO2.  
 
To ensure that CCS is included in the panoply of policy and technology 
options available to address climate change there is a role for governments 
(including Ireland’s) to help develop and demonstrate aspects of the 
technologies necessary for CCS such as storage, and a large-scale 
mandatory CCS project could be imposed as a condition for the future 
continued operation of Moneypoint coal-burning power station. In general, 
however, the most appropriate approach will be to place a price on carbon 
emissions through taxation or an emissions trading scheme. The 
International Energy Agency predicts that the cost of CO2 capture could 
fall 50 per cent by 2030 to $25-50 per tonne of CO2 (Fernando et al. 2008, 
p. 28). In the context of a carbon price this could make CCS an attractive 
option for investment. This should be a decision for private investors, not 
governments, but the government does have a role to play in the meantime 
by helping CCS demonstrate its applicability (if indeed it can be applied at 
scale) through supporting R&D and demonstration. Crucially, the 
government must also ensure that any CCS research or full-scale 
deployment in Ireland be bound by an appropriate regulatory regime that 
measures its performance as well as any impacts to ecosystems or human 
health. 
4.3.6 INFORMATION 
Regulations are also needed to ensure information is delivered through 
such mechanisms as eco-labelling to enable consumers to use their market 
power to reward green producers. Utilities in particular must make it 
possible for consumers to know what quantities they are buying and what 
costs they are incurring. Many barriers that deter would-be investors in 
energy efficiency can be overcome quite easily by the provision of reliable 
and relevant information Scott (1997); Sorrell et al. (2004). 
 
 Subsidies are a way to attempt to secure a particular outcome by 
incentivising favoured technologies or practices. Carefully designed 
subsidies can succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions if set in the 
right policy mix, but, precisely because they need to be carefully designed, 
they are prone to lead to unintended or suboptimal outcomes. Some 
subsidies are outright counterproductive in the context of climate policy, 
such as the requirement for Irish electricity producers to generate electricity 
from burning peat (one of the most carbon-intensive fuels). Some subsidies 
provide perverse incentives, like the subsidy provided until recently for 
public transport through a rebated tax on its fuel rather than on  
what should be encouraged, namely, passenger numbers;  aviation  has  also  
4.4 
Subsidies 
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benefited from a preferential and poorly targeted46 tax treatment (Scott and 
Feeney, 1998). Subsidies are popular, however, because they give large 
benefits to small focused groups while dispersing the costs on society in 
general (Jaffe et al., 2005).  
 
Subsidies effectively make products or services cheaper than they would 
otherwise be. Direct subsidies are easy to observe and measure but indirect 
subsidies, which are less easy to define, have a significant impact. These 
include subsidies to production inputs, such as water, which is significantly 
underpriced in Ireland and encourages over-use and can give false signals 
to expand supply, with concomitant energy use. Although subsidies play a 
positive role in technology research and development discussed in the next 
section, they tend to be quite technology-specific and can be misused.47 
One major example is the set of subsidy structures in place for biofuels to 
help achieve target shares for their future use. EU subsidies to biofuels in 
2006 were an estimated €3.6 billion, through Common Agricultural Policy 
payments and other measures. The Food and Agriculture Organisation’s 
(2008) estimate of global support for biodiesel and ethanol is US$12 billion 
in 2006. This is excluding the costs of the side effects of the policy of 
subsidising biofuels, in diverting food to fuel thereby exacerbating demand 
from an already hard-pressed food supply, and putting pressure on land. 
Similarly, German subsidies to solar panels, via a feed-in electricity price, 
have raised the price of silicon, making solar panels expensive to install in 
more appropriate locations including Africa.48 Germany is not a natural 
location for solar electricity and while a “success” in terms of take-up and 
illustrating the power of price, it also risks upsetting the comparative 
advantage of wind energy, with the temptation for subsidy leap-frogging. 
Subsidy policies are used as a way to sidestep addressing the real culprit of 
global warming directly, namely, carbon emissions.  
 
In the absence of emissions pricing, subsidies to the adoption of new 
technology do not in themselves encourage reduced use of polluting 
technology. Furthermore, they can benefit the very products that ought 
ideally to be discouraged, by helping marginal firms and even encouraging 
new entrants, thereby increasing pollution. They can require large public 
expenditure per unit of effect, since recipients who would have innovated 
anyway may also receive the subsidy (the free rider or additionality issue). 
Another problem arises with the revenue that must be raised to finance 
subsidies, especially when they entail a transfer from tax-payers to fund 
subsidies to upgrade homes that raise the value of private houses. Ireland’s 
targets are onerous to the extent of having potential macroeconomic 
effects, but raising taxes to fund subsidies distorts the allocation of 
resources and moves the economy away from efficient allocation. The cost 
of the subsidy is not just its value, but the extra cost of funding. Studies for 
 
46 This subsidy has now been removed. A targeted measure is one that is correctly applied 
at the point of decision to pollute or not to pollute (or as close as possible to it), e.g. 
whether or not to use another litre of water, petrol, or get a plastic bag etc. At this point 
the user can make a difference to the amount of tax they pay and the effect they have on 
the environment. 
47 The subsidy may be guided by estimates in the MAC, but the cost of abatement in 
individual cases is ultimately unknowable until tried. Sectors in the UK, threatened with a 
carbon price, in many cases abated far more than expected (Salmons, 2007). 
48 “More heat than light”, The Economist, 7 April 2008. 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10989479 
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Ireland put the adjustment factor at well over 1 for multiplying the nominal 
cost of a subsidy to establish the true cost (Barrett et al., 1997; Honohan 
and Irvine, 1987). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there is a role for subsidies in a well-
designed policy mix. Cost-effective technologies that are not widely 
installed could be suffering an information failure and subsidised energy 
audits that recommend energy-saving projects can help overcome this. A 
feed-in tariff for renewable electricity can drive the deployment of new 
technologies to help them achieve economies of scale, although the 
German example showed the danger of setting the subsidy too high. All the 
while systematic assessment of subsidy outcomes is recommended (Jaffe et 
al., 2005). In addition, public funds could be made available through grants 
(e.g. administered by Sustainable Energy Ireland), to direct investment in 
energy efficiency, renewable energy and low carbon emission projects, and 
also to provide a source of capital available to banks and lending 
institutions to subsidise low-interest loans to companies that are seeking 
finance for projects to deliver low carbon or renewable technologies.  
 
 The market failure associated with the emissions externality has already 
been discussed, but the existence of a second market failure must be 
emphasised, which is summed up as the occurrence of knowledge 
spillovers. These spillovers are the results of investment in R&D and of 
learning by doing and information. These results are externalities, but of 
the positive kind, requiring market corrections, in the form of subsidies to 
R&D and production subsidies for demonstrating renewable energy to 
rectify their under-provision. The positive gains are often not captured by 
those who invest in the R&D (Bazilian et al., 2004; Morgenroth and Fitz 
Gerald, 2006; Ryan and Turton, 2007). In the UK a decline in R&D activity 
occurred at the time of reforms to promote competition in the electricity 
sector, because the fruits of their investigations would now be shared by 
other parties (Scott and Evans, 2007). The resulting under-investment and 
lack of development and demonstration of new technology can be rectified 
by government subsidies. Investment in R&D itself may be doubly under-
provided unless there are market corrections dealing with both 
externalities, which pay for the spillover benefits and put a value on 
technology’s output, namely, carbon reduction.  
4.5 
Research and 
Development 
Policy  
 
Optimal correction of two such market failures requires more than one 
single policy and the issue of policy mix has received attention recently 
(Jaffe et al., 2005). In a study that assesses policies for reducing emissions 
and promoting renewable energy in the US electricity sector, Fischer and 
Newell (2008) find that, due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy 
performance involves a portfolio of different instruments. They judge 
optimality by various criteria: economic surplus,49 emissions reduction, 
renewable energy production and R&D. The authors find that an optimal 
portfolio of policies can achieve emissions reductions at a significantly 
lower cost than any single policy, although the reductions continue to be 
due primarily to the emissions price. In particular, they show that an 
emissions price alone, although the least costly of the single policy levers, is 
 
49 The economic surplus is measured as the environmental benefits net of the sum of 
changes in consumer and producer surplus and revenue transfers from subsidies and taxes. 
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significantly more expensive alone than when used in combination with 
optimal knowledge subsidy policies. Also the burden on consumers may be 
large if they do not benefit in some way from revenue transfers (a problem 
of granting permits for free as opposed to bringing in revenue by 
auctioning them, discussed under the section above on emissions trading). 
Importantly a renewables research subsidy on its own is the most costly 
single policy for reducing emissions, and a renewables output subsidy is the 
next most costly, though much less so.50 With the combination policy, the 
required emissions price is much more modest.  
 
Fischer and Newell point to some clear principles that emerge from 
their study. Under the ultimate goal of reducing emissions, policies that 
create incentives for fossil-fuelled generators to reduce emissions intensity, 
and for consumers to conserve energy, perform better than those that rely 
on incentives for renewable energy producers alone. A renewable energy 
R&D subsidy on its own turns out to be an inefficient means of emissions 
reduction, in so far as it postpones the majority of effort to displace fossil-
fuelled generation until after costs are brought down by R&D. In the 
absence of conservation incentives and emissions pricing in particular, it 
requires very large R&D investments and forgoing near-term cost-effective 
abatement opportunities. They state that their results emphasise the 
importance of policies that encourage abatement across all available forms 
and timeframes, as well as highlighting the limitations of narrowly targeted 
policies, particularly those focused solely on R&D.  
 
Research is a major area for state subsidies in Ireland, attracting €8.2 
billion of funding in the 2007-2013 National Development Plan. The 
establishment of the Irish Energy Research Council in 2006 establishes a 
strategy for research in the energy area, but Ireland has historically spent 
less, per capita, on research and development of renewable energy than its 
OECD peers (see Figure 4). Current policy is intended to develop a more 
competitive contribution from indigenous, and in particular, renewable 
energy sources as well as improvements in energy efficiency in transport, 
energy-supply systems, buildings and industry (Government of Ireland 
2006, p. 160). An example might be ocean energy from waves or tides, 
which is abundant around the island of Ireland and, because tidal power is 
predictable, could provide a backup source of energy to support wind 
power (DCMNR, 2005; SEI, 2004, 10). To contain risk, the research needs 
to be shared with other countries and ought to include systematic updates 
of the known and expected comparative costs of emissions abated by 
different technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 The paper concentrates on the mid-term, but the authors point out that R&D focused 
on breakthrough technologies could have greater salience in the context of deeper long-
term emissions reductions. 
  A SURVEY OF CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO IRELAND 41 
Figure 4: IEA Member Government Budgets for Total Renewable Energy R&D Annual 
Investments for 1974-2003 (left) and Investment Per Capita, Averaged Between 
1990 and 2003 (right) 
 
 
Source: Sims et al. (2007), p. 314, reproduced from International Energy Agency. 
 
 
Regular reviews of the State’s research and development and its budget, 
foreseen under the National Development Plan, would help to maximise 
the synergies with Ireland’s climate-change goals. Prioritised according to 
potential savings in abatement costs, research across a broad range of 
technologies can be promoted. One should keep in mind, however, that 
subsidies to R&D reward effort rather than success. R&D subsidies are 
therefore no substitute for a carbon price, which itself would also stimulate 
R&D. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
FOR IRELAND 
The economic recession from 2008 means that the path of Ireland’s 
greenhouse gases is now probably close to complying with its Kyoto 
commitment for 2008-2012. The segment of the economy already covered 
by the EU ETS will automatically be in compliance and so the area of 
uncertainty lies in whether and how many foreign credits will need to be 
purchased to cover emissions from the remainder of the economy. 
Compliance with respect to the stringent 2020 goals set by the European 
Union may also have become somewhat easier, although the extent 
depends on the timing of the economic recovery.  
 
The pause in growth presents not merely a breathing space but a 
valuable opportunity for the Irish government. Political parties can focus 
on the longer-term strategy and determine how to provide the appropriate 
context for building a sustainable economy. Although national emissions 
contribute only a small fraction of global emissions, meeting its EU and 
UN obligations could be important for the country in order to avoid the 
image of free-riding on the efforts of other nations. Moreover, Ireland 
could enhance its standing and perhaps even lead the way by demonstrating 
what can be achieved by intelligent policies that focus properly on 
emissions reduction and avoid many usual routes that waste resources in 
that pursuit. The task is still demanding and therefore efficient approaches 
are needed. 
 
This paper has set out some of the policy options that are available to 
the Irish government in 2009 to reconcile its emissions obligations with its 
aim for economic growth. The issue is not so much the technical feasibility 
as how to “make it happen”, to quote the UK Committee on Climate 
Change.51 There are many ways to reduce emissions; the point is that the 
costs of doing so are subject to a wide range. The task involves recognising 
that the finite resource in question is the planet’s capacity to absorb 
emissions. This limited absorptive capacity, like any beneficial resource or 
factor of production, is inevitably used to the extent that individual entities 
gain by doing so. Our emissions reflect our acquired infrastructure and way 
of life and it was natural to use increasingly more of this “absorptive 
capacity” as it was free. Policies must address this absence of price, the root 
 
51 Committee on Climate Change, 2008, p/xiii. 
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of the problem, otherwise they will be straining against human nature. This 
issue cannot be ducked if we wish to avoid spending sizeable sums of 
taxpayers’ money on policies with disappointing results. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems commonly accepted that the introduction of ideal 
solutions is constrained by political preferences, the inertia of economic 
sectors and the demands of public opinion. It is indeed difficult for 
government, stakeholders and citizens to become conversant with the 
empirical work on the best combination of different instruments and 
measures. More expensive measures may satisfy a political ideal, but such 
decisions, if taken, should be the result of an open process and a proper 
understanding of reasons and of costs and benefits. There may be a case 
for choosing a more expensive approach to ensure equity to vulnerable 
members of society, for instance, though clearly not if there are better ways 
to protect them or if it is merely kinder to a valued political constituency at 
the expense of society as a whole. An open process that is subject to public 
scrutiny and appraisal of alternatives is less likely to be abused in such a 
way. 
 
As a general approach, we recommend the following criteria and priorities: 
 
1. Regulatory certainty: Government should establish the necessary 
credible long-term political certainty to guide investment decisions 
and other areas of government policy. Such certainty reduces risks 
and creates an environment conducive to long-term decisions. To 
this end, the government should promote wide understanding to 
encourage agreement on Ireland’s target beyond 2020, indicative 
short-term interim implications and the policies to meet such 
targets. Using evidence-based research and estimates of abatement 
costs, such a policy consensus should be struck with all- or nearly 
all-party agreement and should be based on a process of 
consultation and stakeholder involvement along the lines of the 
Social Partnership Agreements. The need for a framework that 
facilitates adoption of the best abatement options, which may not 
really be known, or even knowable, will then become clear. The 
envisaged Commission on Climate Change as foreseen in the 
Programme for Government would play a central role. It should be 
able to remove decisions on climate policy from short-term political 
considerations, and may one day achieve an independent position. 
Without fear of vested interests it should be able to present policies 
that are best for the economy while safeguarding the vulnerable. 
 
2. Clearly defined incentives: Given the nature of the underlying problem, 
a key requirement is to ensure a credible long-term price of carbon. 
Would-be investors in abatement technology cannot operate 
properly without this reassurance. To avoid worthwhile carbon 
reduction opportunities being overlooked as at present, every 
emitter, that is, everyone, needs to be faced with this price, not just 
those entities that operate in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Where carbon prices currently apply, that is in the EU ETS, they 
are determined by the abatement costs of the scheme’s participants 
and the targets, which are short-term targets. If it is found that 
having a broader pricing regime is still insufficient to drive the 
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target decarbonisation of the Irish economy, complementary 
measures would be required to deliver carbon reductions in specific 
sectors of the economy in an efficient and equitable way. These 
measures will be helped with the correct incentive pricing, rather 
than hindered by its absence as at present.  
 
3. Transparent, dynamic and fair process: The process by which Ireland 
reduces its greenhouse gas emissions is similarly important. The 
Commission on Climate Change should oversee the formulation 
and implementation of the national climate-change strategy, which 
should be entirely open to input from stakeholders and the general 
public. It should be accompanied by a regular public reporting 
method to reveal the performance of individual economic sectors 
and government departments/policy areas. Appraisals should take 
all costs including environmental costs into account in a consistent 
manner; to this end the Commission should update and extend 
assessments of detailed abatement opportunities and actions across 
the economy to demonstrate options and their associated costs. To 
the extent that intermediaries would automatically satisfy the 
demand for this analysis under correct carbon pricing, the 
Commission’s role would be to ensure that gaps are addressed and 
the integrity of information is upheld. Relative costs of domestic 
versus foreign schemes for reducing emissions should be explicit 
and the Commission should keep abreast of technical potential, 
costs and international policy processes. It should devote significant 
effort to gain public support for climate change measures across all 
segments of society with correctly pitched information. 
Transparency also requires that revenues arising from the price 
imposed on carbon are tracked. Because carbon revenues 
(including windfalls from grand-parented permits) derive from the 
planet’s “common resource” these revenues should accrue to 
government. This is needed for national use to shield the vulnerable 
according to need and to help the macroeconomy. The 
macroeconomy is best helped by using the revenues in such areas 
as protecting competitiveness and reducing employment costs in 
particular. Sub-optimal use of revenues adds to policy cost and 
needs to be resisted.  
 
How do the policy options considered in this paper perform on these 
criteria? The main ones are outlined now. 
 
Regulatory instruments have an important role to play, especially in areas 
where individuals do not have expertise, such as in building standards, or 
where a framework for development is needed that considers the common 
good, especially for the long term, notably spatial planning and urban 
design. Other instances occur where individuals are discouraged from 
installing energy efficiency measures because they cannot reap a direct 
benefit, e.g., landlord’s properties require regulation as do other instances 
of a principal-agent relationship. It is easy for standards to multiply, 
explode even, if they aspire to deal with every situation and action. 
Standards and regulations can impose widely different carbon reduction 
costs, including administration costs, on individuals and entities. Some 
actions forced on people can be expensive in their case and some cheap 
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actions are omitted – such variation in abatement cost violates criterion 2 
above and risks raising abatement costs overall. On the other hand, some 
regulations may be worthwhile in any event and may provide valuable 
information in to the bargain, e.g., Building Energy Ratings. This of course 
can be validated by appraisal based on an explicit carbon price. 
 
Market-based instruments by contrast, put a price on carbon emissions. These 
include subsidies, emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes. The extent 
to which they secure a credible long-term price and encourage best actions, 
and the manner of their impact on the macroeconomy and vulnerable 
groups, will differ according to the instrument chosen and manner of 
application.  
 
Subsidies usually reward inputs and do not directly put a price on emissions. 
Ensuing emissions reductions per se are brought about at a high cost that 
has to be funded by the general tax-payer. Unless subsidies are in some 
manner awarded according to an amount of carbon saved, their incentive 
properties can be weak and they are an expensive way to reduce emissions. 
The application of subsidies is called for in the case of bodies that are 
capital-constrained, such as low-income households. An area where 
subsidies can pay off is in the field of knowledge and information. There 
are economies of scale in gathering technical information about energy 
efficiency. Subsidies to information agencies, for example, are worthwhile 
in order to reduce the barriers, such as unfamiliarity and hassle, to would-
be private investors. The form and relevance of information also matter: 
case studies help if people recognise that they are relevant to them. 
Research and Development also provide external benefits that merit 
subsidies.  
 
Turning to emissions trading, the EU ETS has provided valuable information 
from which much is being learned. In order to control volatility in the price 
of carbon permits and thus satisfy criterion 2, a floor price and a ceiling 
price may be considered if it could be made consistent with other policy 
goals such as an international carbon market. To satisfy fairness as in 
criterion 3, permits should be purchased at auction from the State. This 
would level the playing field for incumbents and new entrants and would 
enable correct use to be made of funds accruing from carbon pricing. 
Freely allocated permits are a transfer from the people to the recipients of 
permits. The problem is not rectified by then requiring the recipients to 
undertake social functions that sit uncomfortably with their interests, such 
as the requirement that UK energy utilities help their customers use less 
energy, for example. 
 
Carbon taxes satisfy many of the desired criteria. They can provide a credible 
long-term carbon price and they automatically reward climate-friendly 
behaviour (including investment, R&D and recycling). They provide 
revenue that enables “environmental tax reform”, that is, the revenue can 
be used to help competitiveness and employment while also supporting 
vulnerable groups according to need. In the special case of vulnerable 
industries, it is found that these can respond well to negotiated agreements. 
Protection of domestic industry by means of border tax adjustments is a 
less favoured approach, though pilot work that can help estimate their 
levels should be and has been done. There are merits to carbon taxes 
during a fiscal contraction, when they can replace other relatively damaging 
tax hikes. Moreover, where carbon taxes have been applied they have not 
been found wanting, either in terms of economic effect or emissions 
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reduction. They can be operated alongside the emissions trading scheme in 
which a floor and ceiling are imposed on the price of permits, in a “hybrid 
ETS”. The requirement of a common price can be satisfied if the rate of 
tax is related to the forward price of emissions permits. Political 
interference violating criterion 1, for example to reduce the carbon tax 
burden during recessions, has its counterpart in an emissions trading 
system, where it is likely to influence how the cap is shared out. 
 
In brief, these are the main instruments that governments have to hand 
and it is important to ensure that the instruments work together. The EU 
ETS is established for now and it controls 30 per cent of emissions, and 
Phase III adopts some of the necessary improvements to the scheme. The 
effect of these would be to provide a more credible long-term price of 
carbon, to which a carbon tax applied to the remainder of the emissions 
would need to be linked with maximum flexibility allowed between them. 
Regulations have specific roles to play but subsidies are an expensive 
approach. 
 
This synthesis report discussed the main policy options for reducing 
Ireland’s emissions and attempted to clarify some of the issues. In sum, 
Irish society as a whole will have to pay more if the best policies, and the 
best mix thereof, are not used. Less efficient policies increase the costs of 
achieving a given target and reduce the ability of the government to drive 
Ireland’s development in a more sustainable direction. 
 
ANNEX 1: ANNUALISED 
EMISSION REDUCTIONS 
     
Year 3% Annual 
Reduction 
(MtCO2e) 
% of 1990 
Baseline 
% 
4% Annual 
Reduction 
(MtCO2e) 
% of 1990 
Baseline 
% 
     
1990 55.08  55.08  
     
2007 69.21 126 69.21 126 
2008 67.13 122 66.44 121 
2009 65.11 118 63.78 116 
2010 63.16 115 61.23 111 
2011 61.27 111 58.78 107 
2012 59.43 108 56.43 102 
2013 57.65 105 54.17 98 
2014 55.92 102 52.00 94 
2015 54.24 98 49.92 91 
2016 52.61 96 47.93 87 
2017 51.03 93 46.01 84 
2018 49.50 90 44.17 80 
2019 48.02 87 42.40 77 
2020 46.58 85 40.71 74 
2021 45.18 82 39.08 71 
2022 43.82 80 37.52 68 
2023 42.51 77 36.01 65 
2024 41.23 75 34.57 63 
2025 40.00 73 33.19 60 
2026 38.80 70 31.86 58 
2027 37.63 68 30.59 56 
2028 36.50 66 29.37 53 
2029 35.41 64 28.19 51 
2030 34.35 62 27.06 49 
2031 33.32 60 25.98 47 
2032 32.32 59 24.94 45 
2033 31.35 57 23.94 43 
2034 30.41 55 22.99 42 
2035 29.49 54 22.07 40 
2036 28.61 52 21.18 38 
2037 27.75 50 20.34 37 
2038 26.92 49 19.52 35 
2039 26.11 47 18.74 34 
2040 25.33 46 17.99 33 
2041 24.57 45 17.27 31 
2042 23.83 43 16.58 30 
2043 23.12 42 15.92 29 
2044 22.42 41 15.28 28 
2045 21.75 39 14.67 27 
2046 21.10 38 14.08 26 
2047 20.46 37 13.52 25 
2048 19.85 36 12.98 24 
2049 19.26 35 12.46 23 
2050 18.68 34 11.96 22 
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ANNEX 2: CARBON 
TAXES AT RATES 
RANGING FROM €5 TO 
€30 PER TONNE CO2 
       
Possible Carbon Tax Rates (Euro Per Tonne of 
CO2) 5 10 15 20 25 30 
  
 Carbon Tax (Euro Per Unit) 
DOMESTIC 
Premium Unleaded Gasoline 95 RON (litre) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Automotive Diesel – Non-Commercial User (litre) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 
Natural Gas – Household (kWh) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Electricity – Household (kWh)   0.003 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.018
Light Fuel Oil – Household (1,000 litres) 13.42 26.83 40.25 53.67 67.09 80.5 
Briquettes (bale) 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.48 0.60 0.72 
Premium domestic coal (tonne) 14.08 28.16 42.24 56.32 70.40 84.47 
       
COMMERCIAL       
Automotive Diesel – Commercial User (litre) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 
Natural Gas – Industry (10**7 kcal GCV = TOE) 11.89 23.78 35.67 47.56 59.45 71.34 
Electricity – Industry (kWh) 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.018
Light Fuel Oil – Industry (1,000 litres) 13.42 26.83 40.25 53.67 67.09 80.5 
High Sulphur Fuel Oil – Industry (tonne) 15.67 31.34 47.01 62.68 78.35 94.02 
Jet Fuel (litre) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Marine Diesel (litre) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 
       
Notes: Figures are subject to rounding. 
   Emission factors from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Sustainable Energy Ireland (SEI). 
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